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ABSTRACT

Beneath the veil of our affluent, sexually permissive capitalist society, Herbert
Marcuse identifies a deep-rooted contradiction concerning how sexuality is made to
operate in this system. On his account, our current civilization is characterized by the
wholesale incorporation, or "containment," of all dimensions of human life into a system
that seeks to control and dominate individuals. With regards to sexuality in particular,
Marcuse maintains that the increased liberalization of sexuality represents its effective
containment within a system that reduces all human interests and activities to their
market value and binds individuals to a market system structured to maximize profit and
impoverish human experience. In the following thesis, I explore the development of
Marcuse's thought on sexual repression under late capitalism and explicate the
connections between his position and that of Sigmund Freud.
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PROLOGUE

The claim that sexuality has become increasingly liberalized over the past several
decades in advanced industrial civilization is hardly controversial. Indeed, it would be
virtually impossible to proceed through an ordinary day without confronting various
images, advertisements, and products which make use of and appeal to sexuality.
Television programs and commercials, billboards and magazines inform us how we
might become more attractive, marketable, productive members of society and provide us
with the means for completing our otherwise inadequate sexual image. Countless selfhelp books prescribe various ways to appeal to potential partners and highlight the
appropriate techniques with which to complete our sexual transactions. Considering the
ubiquity of sexuality both in and outside of the work place, one might conclude that our
libidinal drives have been emancipated from the repressive clutches of Puritanism and
that the current social order has liberated sexuality to an unprecedented extent.
Throughout much of his work, Herbert Marcuse takes this conclusion to task. In
One-Dimensional Man, he remarks that "advanced industrial civilization operates with a
greater degree of sexual freedom—'operates' in the sense that the latter becomes a
market value and a factor of social mores."1 On his account, late capitalist society is
characterized by the wholesale incorporation of all dimensions of human life into a
system which seeks to control and dominate individuals in order to maximize profit for a
relative few. Marcuse maintains that individuals actively contribute to the reproduction of

Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1964) p. 74.
8

the capitalist system—the "affluent monster" —due to our instinctual identification with
the comforts, commodities, and sexual horizons provided by the establishment. As such,
he argues that the liberalization of sexuality within the repressive order of domination
actually serves to perpetuate this very system.
Throughout his work on the repression of sexuality under late capitalism, Marcuse
proceeds from Sigmund Freud's metapsychology and late theory of "instincts," the
"primary 'drives' of the human organism which are subject to historical modification."3
In doing so, he attempts to provide rigorous psychological support for his critical theory
of society. As we shall see throughout this essay, Marcuse employs many of Karl Marx's
concepts and categories in order to extrapolate the historical and sociological
implications of Freud's ambivalent critique of civilization along more resolutely socialist
lines.
This is not to suggest, however, that Marcuse attempts to 'add' a sociological or
political dimension to Freudian theory. Unlike the Neo-Freudian schools, he wishes to
reveal that "Freud's theory is in its very substance 'sociological,' and that no new cultural
or sociological orientation is needed to reveal this substance."4 Furthermore, he is not
attempting to improve psychoanalytic theory and practice. Rather, his task "is to
contribute to the philosophy of psychoanalysis—not to psychoanalysis itself."5 On this
basis, Marcuse levels a thoroughgoing critique of sexual repression under advanced
industrial civilization and attempts to account for how and why individuals have

2

Idem, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 7.
Idem, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955) p. 8.
4
Ibid., p. 5.
5
Ibid., p. 7.
9
3

increasingly come to identify—at the instinctual level—with a system that does not
represent their interests.
The task of this essay is to explore the development of Marcuse's thought on the
historically specific forms of repression in advanced industrial civilization through a
detailed explication of both psychoanalytic theory and Marcuse's critical appropriation of
this theory. The essay will be divided into three relatively equal parts. In Chapter 1, I
intend to trace the evolution of Freudian theory by offering a thorough explication of
several key psychoanalytic concepts. To begin, I shall elucidate Freud's distinction
between the "pleasure principle" and the "reality principle." Next, I shall highlight the
clinical cases which lead Freud to posit the dualism of "life instincts" and "death
instincts" and explain how this new instinctual dynamic alters his earlier theory. Finally, I
will discuss Freud's notions of "repression" and "sublimation" and elucidate his reasons
for suggesting that civilization depends upon the continuous renunciation and deflection
of instinctual energy.
Chapter 2 will focus on Marcuse's early interpretation and critical application of
psychoanalytic theory in Eros and Civilization. In this chapter, I shall begin by
explicating his historical extrapolation of Freud's basic concepts and explain the ways in
which he employs these revised terms in order to indict the unnecessary modes of sexual
repression in advanced industrial civilization. I will then consider his arguments for the
historical and theoretical possibilities of reversing the excessive modes of instinctual
restraint necessitated by the prevailing social order.
In Chapter 3, I shall return to the contemporary context with which I began by
considering Marcuse's argument that the current "liberalization" of sexuality represents
10

its effective incorporation within a more efficient system of control and domination. I
shall highlight Marcuse's claim that the relaxation of sexual taboos, the incorporation of
sexual expression and behaviour into the work place, and the mass dissemination of
prescribed sexual horizons in the advertising and entertainment industries, bind
individuals to a market system structured against the greater potentialities of human
beings. These emerging trends reveal the repressive modes of "desublimation" in
contemporary civilization, which replace lasting instinctual gratification with immediate
libidinal satisfaction in a fundamentally unfree society.
In Freudian terms, this essay might be thought of as a "sublimation" of instinctual
and intellectual energy—a "transformation of passion" to the end of articulating certain
ideas and arguments that are edifying and perhaps useful. According to Hans W.
Loewald, sublimation is often thought of as a process by which the individual is able to
"master" reality, "mastery conceived not as domination but as coming to terms—as it
brings external and material reality within the compass of psychic reality, and psychic
reality within the sweep of external reality."6 In this light, the present inquiry is intended
to "master" the works of Freud and Marcuse by "coming to terms" with their crucial
insights and elucidating the connections between these two thinkers.

6

Hans W. Loewald, Sublimation: Inquiries into Theoretical Psychoanalysis (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1988) p. 22. Loewald also characterizes his own work as an act of sublimation: "It is a sobering and
strangely comforting thought that writing these investigations has been a sublimated way of cleaning and
preening myself, like a cat after a meal, or after a frustrating hunt." Ibid., p. ix.
11

CHAPTER 1
THE BILDUNGSMACHTE1 OF MARCUSE'S CRITICAL SEXUAL THEORY:
SIGMUND FREUD

A thorough explication of some of Freud's fundamental concepts is necessary in
order to lay the groundwork for my treatment of Marcuse's work. In Section 1, I shall
begin by elucidating Freud's distinction between the "pleasure principle" and the "reality
principle," the "two principles of mental functioning" governing psychical life. These
two principles are treated in relation to the conscious and unconscious dimensions of
mental life and to the various functions of the ego. In Section 2, I will examine the
emergence of the "life instincts" and the "death instincts" in Beyond the Pleasure
Principle before turning to Freud's discussion of aggressiveness as a manifestation of the
death instincts in Civilization and Its Discontents. On the basis of this discussion of the
inherent erotic and aggressive drives of human beings, Section 3 will focus on the notion
of "repression" at both the individual (psychical) and social levels. Finally, in Section 4 I
shall briefly explicate Freud's concept of "sublimation," which is arguably one of the
most important and at the same time enigmatic terms in Freudian theory.
Throughout this chapter, I will offer a fairly standard interpretation of Freud's
crucial concepts without relying too heavily upon Marcuse's own characterization of
psychoanalytic theory. I should mention, however, that Freud's notions of pleasure and

7

When asked to describe the significance of Freud for the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer answered:
"We really are deeply indebted to Freud and his first collaborators. His thought is one of the
Bildungsmachte [foundation stones] without which our own philosophy would not be what it is." Cited in
Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1995) p. 1.
12

reality, life and death, repression and sublimation do not comprise a systematic whole; he
often relies upon hypothesis, speculation, and conjecture in order to account for certain
trends in individual mentation and behaviour that could not be explained using any
existing psychological categories. Considering the complexity of the Freudian project and
the many alterations it has undergone since Freud's writings, my discussion of these key
psychoanalytic concepts will be selective and incomplete.
Furthermore, in order to trace the development of these concepts and dualisms
thematically, many of Freud's related concepts—narcissism, Oedipus complex, superego,
etc.—will recur and develop in each section. I ask the reader to forgive these unavoidable
repetitions. The point of this chapter is to lay the Freudian groundwork from which
Marcuse proceeds, striving at all times for the utmost thematic and systematic unity even
where the subject matter is not wholly amenable to such treatment.

SECTION 1: PLEASURE AND REALITY
In his essay "On Narcissism," Freud argues that the mental apparatus is "first and
foremost a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as
distressing or would have pathogenic effects." The individual's mental organization is
thus structured to decrease the amount of unpleasurable tensions in the psychical
apparatus and to press towards the pleasurable release, or "discharge," of instinctual
impulses. First and foremost, then, the mental apparatus is governed by the "pleasure
principle." Throughout his work on this "principle of mental functioning," Freud equates

8

Sigmund Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 85.
13

the pleasure principle with the hypothesis of constancy.

In Beyond the Pleasure

Principle, Freud argues that "the mental apparatus endeavours to keep the quantity of
excitation present in it as low as possible or at least to keep it constant."10 Accordingly,
Freud claims that the psychical structure of the individual seeks to maintain a level of
stability which can only be ensured by decreasing the quantity of mental excitations, or at
least by keeping them constant.
Under the influence of external pressures and demands, however, a new principle
of mental functioning emerges in order to safeguard the demands of the pleasure
principle and to ensure that the organism does not destroy itself in its relentless pursuit of
immediate gratification. This "reality principle" does not abandon the drive towards
instinctual gratification and the lowering of mental excitations. Rather, it "demands and
carries into effect the postponement of satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of
possibilities of gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step
on the long indirect road to pleasure."11 In this sense, then, the pleasure principle must be
superseded by the reality principle in order to secure lasting instinctual gratification under
the often constraining limitations of the external world.
As Marcuse argues in Eros and Civilization, the distinction between the pleasure
principle and the reality principle "corresponds largely (but not entirely) to the distinction
between unconscious and conscious processes." On Freud's view, the pleasure principle

9

Freud characterizes the principle of constancy thus: "the nervous system is an apparatus which has the
function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level; or which,
if it were feasible, would maintain itself in an altogether unstimulated condition." See "Instincts and their
Vicissitudes," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 14, tr.
James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 120.
10
Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, tr. James Strachey, (New York: Liverlight, 1961) p. 1-2.
11
Ibid., p. 4.
12
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 12.
14

corresponds to the unconscious, or the "primary processes," while the reality principle is
bound up with consciousness, or the "secondary processes." In his "Formulations on the
Two Principles of Mental Functioning," Freud explains this connection between the
pleasure principle and unconscious processes when he claims that the "governing purpose
obeyed by these primary processes is easy to recognize; it is described as the pleasureunpleasure [Lust-Unlust] principle, or more shortly the pleasure principle....Our dreams
at night and our waking tendency to tear ourselves away from distressing impressions are
remnants of the dominance of this principle and proofs of its power."13 The goal of these
unconscious processes is to break through the barrier that separates them from
consciousness in order to release unpleasurable tensions through a discharge of
instinctual impulses. These processes—represented, in part, by the id—are timeless in the
sense that they "are not ordered temporally, that time does not change them in any way
and that the idea of time cannot be applied to them."14 The id operates solely in
accordance with "the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regulation."15
While the pleasure principle governs the unconscious realm of the psychical
apparatus, or the primary process, Paul Ricoeur reminds us that "in general, reality is the
correlate of the function of consciousness." While the unconscious processes attempt to
"cathect" certain instinctual demands, ideas, and wishes—that is, to charge these
"ideational representatives" of instinct with a store of instinctual energy to achieve

13

Freud, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 12, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth
Press, 1958) pp. 218-219.
14
Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 22.
15
Idem, "The Unconscious," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, Vol. 14, tr. James Strachey, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957) p. 187.
16
Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, tr. Denis Savage, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970) p. 261.
15

discharge—the preconscious and conscious systems attempt to prevent these libidinal
cathexes from invading consciousness and potentially destroying the organism. When
faced with the pressures of external reality, the mature ego develops out of the id in order
to meet the demands of the outside world and to prevent the id from recklessly pursuing
its discharge of unpleasurable tensions. This process of identifying the demands of the
external world and attempting to achieve lasting gratification under these conditions
involves "reality-testing," which the id effectively ignores in its pursuit of immediate
gratification. The ego repels the id's attempts at libidinal invasion by establishing
"anticathexes," by which it continuously prevents certain ideas and wishes from entering
consciousness and achieving discharge.
What has been put forth thus far remains within the framework of Freud's early
libido theory, in which he distinguishes between the sexual instincts and the egoinstincts.17 The ego-instincts are the drives towards self-preservation; they uphold the
reality principle in order to secure lasting instinctual gratification without destroying the
individual.18 By contrast, the sexual instincts, which constitute the "libido" proper, seek
gratification through "object-cathexis," or by channeling instinctual impulses towards
objects in the external world.19 However, Freud explains that the sexual instincts "behave
auto-erotically at first; they obtain their satisfaction in the subject's own body and
therefore do not find themselves in the situation of frustration which was what

17

As we shall see in the next section, this opposition is complicated by the introduction of narcissism and
the "compulsion to repeat," at which point Freud distinguishes between the life instincts and the death
instincts, Eros and Thanatos.
18
It should be noted here that the "ego-instincts," like the sexual instincts, refer to a group of instinctual
drives rather than one overarching drive: "Freud introduced the term 'ego-instincts' and identified these on
the one hand with the self-preservative instincts and on the other with the repressive function." See the
editor's introduction to "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 115.
19
Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 54.
16

necessitated the institution of the reality principle." As a result, the sexual instinct "is
held up in its psychical development and remains far longer under the dominance of the
pleasure principle, from which in many people it is never able to withdraw."20
Just as Plato acknowledges that the majority of the population in the republic
would be unable to overcome their appetitive drives, Freud argues that the sexual
instincts are difficult to "educate" and that the majority of individuals remain largely
under their sway. Even in those individuals who have established sufficient mastery over
their desires, the sexual instincts retain their dominant role in "phantasy" and in dreams.
These insights support our earlier observation that the pleasure principle corresponds to
unconscious mental processes while the reality principle is the correlate of consciousness.
At this point, we can draw a further connection between "the sexual instinct and phantasy
and, on the other hand, between the ego-instincts and the activities of consciousness."21
Although the ego-instincts are associated with "the activities of consciousness,"
Freud reminds us that the ego is merely an offshoot of the id and that "much of the ego is
•

•

99

•

•

•

itself unconscious." It is by virtue of its partially unconscious character that the ego can
be said to have its own instincts. The dual function of the ego is thus made explicit: in
one respect, the ego seeks to satisfy the instinctual demands of the id of which it is
merely an outgrowth; in another respect, the ego detaches itself from the internal world of
the id, represents the demands of the reality principle, and carries out the satisfaction of
its now separate self-preservative instincts. Freud establishes this dual function of the ego
by distinguishing between the pleasure-ego and the reality-ego: "[j]ust as the pleasure20

Idem, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," p. 222.
Ibid., p. 222.
22
Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 13.
17
21

ego can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid unpleasure, so the
reality-ego need do nothing but strive for what is useful and guard itself against
damage."

In order for the reality principle to supersede the pleasure principle, the

pleasure-ego must be transformed into the reality-ego.
Alongside this transformation of the mental apparatus, Freud argues that "the
sexual instincts undergo the changes that lead them from their original auto-eroticism
through various intermediate phases to object-love in the service of procreation."24 This
sublation of the pleasure principle by the reality principle—of the pleasure-ego by the
reality-ego—does not imply that the pleasure principle is completely abandoned. Rather,
Freud makes it quite clear that this substitution "implies no deposing of the pleasure
principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is
given up, but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later
time."25
While the psychical apparatus tends to progress from auto-eroticism to "objectlove in the service of procreation," Freud identifies certain clinical cases in which
individuals do not seek instinctual gratification through object-cathexis. Instead, these
individuals withdraw their libidinal interest from the external world and direct it toward
their own ego, a phenomenon which Freud labels "narcissism." At the earliest stages of
psychosexual development, the individual "has originally two sexual objects—himself
and the woman who nurses him." At these stages, the child is "polymorphous perverse"
in the sense that he is able to achieve gratification through several "zones" of his own

23

Idem, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," p. 223.
Ibid., p. 224.
25
Ibid., p. 223.
18
24

body and does not yet rely exclusively upon object-cathexes in order to obtain pleasure.
Furthermore, at these stages the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts are virtually
indistinguishable in that the child satisfies the demands of both sexual gratification and
self-preservation through the mother's breast, from which the child has not yet fully
separated himself.

In this regard, Freud postulates "a primary narcissism in everyone,

which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his object-choice."27
After the trials of the Oedipal conflict, the child must direct the libido toward the
external world and seek instinctual satisfaction through various objects. However, some
individuals find the demands of the reality principle, and the inevitable delays in
gratification it necessitates, too difficult to bear and retain their libido in their own ego.
Citing Ferenczi, Freud considers the case of an individual "who is tormented by organic
pain and discomfort [and] gives up his interest in the things of the external world." This
"sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and sends them out
TO

again when he recovers."

Freud labels this temporary withdrawal of libido from the

external world "secondary narcissism," which denotes "the attitude of a person who treats
his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily
treated."

This "narcissistic withdrawal," which also occurs in the non-pathogenic cases

of sleep and dreams, marks an individual's rejection of the harsh demands of the reality
principle.

For a more complete discussion of the undifferentiated unity of mother and child, see Loewald's
discussion of the "infant-mother matrix" in Sublimation, chapters 2 and 3.
27
Freud, "On Narcissism," p. 88.
28
Ibid., p. 82.
29
Ibid.,p. 73.
19

As Marcuse claims in Eros and Civilization, "the discovery of primary narcissism
meant more than the addition of just another phase to the development of the libido."
Indeed, Marcuse finds in primary narcissism "the archetype of another existential relation
to reality."30 Although we will have occasion to consider Marcuse's view of primary
narcissism in the next chapter, it is necessary here to highlight two crucial alterations of
Freudian theory necessitated by this concept. First, Freud's discussion of narcissism
challenges the initial dualism of the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts by revealing
that the ego also contains libido. In "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," Freud claims that the
case of narcissism reveals that "the ego is always the main reservoir of libido, from which
libidinal cathexes of objects go out and into which they return again, while the major part
of this libido remains permanently in the ego." In this regard, "ego libido is being
T 1

constantly changed into object libido and object libido into ego libido."

These claims

challenge Freud's earlier view that the ego-instincts strive exclusively for the selfpreservation of the organism and that the sexual instincts constitute the "libido" proper.
Furthermore, the clinical observations of narcissism challenge Freud's first
topography of the mental apparatus, in which he divides the psychical structure into
unconscious, preconscious, and conscious domains. The narcissistic withdrawal from the
demands of the external world involves the establishment of an ego-ideal, "by which [the
individual] measures his actual ego."32 The ego-ideal emerges after the trials of the
Oedipus complex, at which time the child abandons the mother as a possible object of

Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 168.
Freud, "Anxiety and Instinctual Life," New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, tr. James Strachey,
ed. Angela Richards, (New York: Penguin, 1991) pp. 135-6.
32
Idem, "On Narcissism," pp. 93-4.
20
31

sexual gratification, identifies with the father, and "internalizes" his paternal authority.
This early discussion of the ego-ideal provides the theoretical foundation for what Freud
will later call the "superego" in The Ego and the Id. As we shall see in the next section,
these complications surrounding narcissism clear the way for Freud's second topography
of psychical life (id, ego, superego) and the new dualism of the life instincts and the death
instincts.

SECTION 2: LIFE AND DEATH

Throughout his "Papers on Metapsychology," Freud maintains his distinction
between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts and reiterates his view that the mental
apparatus is initially governed by the pleasure principle. As we have seen, however, the
introduction of narcissism complicates Freud's strict disarticulation of ego-instincts and
sexual instincts by revealing that the ego is the main "reservoir of libido"—that the egoinstincts, too, are libidinal in character. In Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud claims
that the distinction between the sexual instincts and the ego-instincts "is merely a
working hypothesis, to be retained only so long as it proves useful, and it will make little
difference to the results of our work of description and classification if it is replaced by
another."33 It is not until 1920 that Freud finds occasion to "replace" his early libido
theory on the basis of clinical cases that challenge the dominance of the pleasure
principle.

Idem, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 124.
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In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud claims that the task of psychoanalysis is
to communicate to the patient certain ideas and experiences that he or she has repressed
and to "oblige the patient to confirm the analyst's construction from his own memory."34
In doing so, the patient is able to come to terms with the repressed desires and traumatic
experiences that have resulted in neuroses. However, Freud considers the case of
individuals who are unable to corroborate the analyst's interpretation and thus fail to
recognize the unconscious repressed material as belonging to past experiences of failure
and distress. Accordingly, these individuals are "obliged to repeat the repressed material
as a contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see,
remembering it as something belonging to the past."35 In short, such individuals are
compelled to bring about the same childhood experiences of frustration that occurred
during the Oedipus complex.
Although the ego's resistance to remembering experiences of distress can be
attributed, in part, to the pleasure principle—since the ego "seeks to avoid the unpleasure
which would be produced by the liberation of the repressed"36—the compulsion to repeat
these distressing situations causes more unpleasure than if they had emerged as memories
or dreams.37 The patient is compelled to relive "experiences which include no possibility
TO

of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction."

While

Freud observes these tendencies most readily in those suffering from neurosis, he claims
that such tendencies can also be observed in "normal" individuals. As Ricoeur explains,
Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, p. 12.
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Ibid., p. 14.
Ibid,p. 15.
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the compulsion to repeat is "further evidenced in the strange fate of those persons who
seem to call down upon themselves the same misfortunes time and again."39 On the basis
of these observations, Freud believes that he has found tendencies that are "more
primitive, more elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle."40
Freud attempts to account for these tendencies by describing consciousness as a
protective barrier erected against the influx of external stimuli. He claims that what
"consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the
external world and of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which can only arise from
within the mental apparatus."41 External stimuli thus penetrate into the psychical
apparatus from without and, in turn, the individual experiences either pleasure or
unpleasure.
To this notion of consciousness as a "shield" separating the unconscious from the
external world, Freud relates Breuer's distinction between "bound" and "freely mobile"
cathexis. Whereas freely mobile cathexis can charge certain ideas or desires with
instinctual energy for immediate discharge, bound cathexis is that instinctual energy
which the ego has mastered and controlled.

2

The task of consciousness qua protective

shield against stimuli is to "bind" the energy that penetrates the system from without so
as to control it and regulate the discharge of instinctual impulses. This barrier takes the
form of "anxiety," the state of expecting or preparing for danger, in order to prepare the
mental apparatus to bind external stimuli.
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In the case of those individuals who compulsively repeat traumatic experiences
from early childhood, Freud argues that the protective barrier against stimuli was initially
unable to bind the influx of energy coming from outside. Indeed, traumatic experiences
are defined precisely as those "excitations from outside which are powerful enough to
break through the protective shield."43 hi these early traumatic situations, the protective
barrier is temporarily put out of action, anxiety is not aroused to respond to the influx of
energy, and the mental apparatus is flooded with unmanageable amounts of stimuli.
Those individuals who repeat traumatic situations as fresh experiences, as well as those
"normal" individuals who continuously repeat their mistakes, are thus "endeavouring to
master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the
cause of the traumatic neurosis."44 On this basis, Freud argues that the task of binding the
energy that flows into the apparatus is "prior to the aim of gaining pleasure and avoiding
unpleasure." 5
This discussion of the compulsion to repeat culminates in a pivotal question,
namely, "how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the compulsion to repeat?"
Freud claims that he has arrived at a universal attribute of instincts: "an instinct is an
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity
has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces."46 This
newly discovered attribute of instinctual life highlights the conservative nature of the
drives, the "inertia inherent in organic life." With the coming to life of inanimate matter,
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the instincts propel the organism toward a state of rest that is free of unpleasurable
excitations—the state of nirvana. Accordingly, rather than arguing that death is caused by
forces external to the individual, Freud claims that the human organism proceeds towards
death for internal, instinctual reasons. On this reading, the self-preservative instincts are
conservative in the sense that they sustain life on the long, circuitous path toward death;
at most, they ensure that the organism dies "in its own fashion." 7 The sexual instincts are
also conservative in that they are "peculiarly resistant to external influences," and "in that
they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period."48 Ultimately, both the sexual
instincts and the ego-instincts attempt to lead the organism back to an earlier state.
It is on the basis of the conservative nature of the drives that the death instinct
emerges. Initially, Freud is tempted to equate the ego-instincts with the death instinct,
since "they arise from the coming to life of inanimate matter and seek to restore the
inanimate state."49 In contradistinction to these instincts, Freud claims that the sexual
instincts are the great exception to the organism's inherent movement towards death. He
argues that the sexual instincts seek to "combine organic substances into ever larger
unities" through the coalescence of two germ cells.50 In this regard, the sexual instincts
"operate against the purpose of the other instincts, which leads, by reason of their
function, to death."5
Recalling his earlier arguments surrounding narcissism, however, Freud
withdraws his view that the ego-instincts function simply to bring about death. Since the
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object-libido of the sexual instincts returns to the ego in narcissism, and since the ego is
formed and matures on the basis of this return of libido into the ego,52 the ego is
considered the main reservoir of libido. Insofar as both the ego-instincts and the sexual
instincts are libidinal in character, then, Freud subsumes them under the label "Eros" and
opposes them to the death instincts.
In The Ego and the Id, Freud claims that both the life instincts and the death
instincts are "active in every particle of living substance, though in unequal
proportions."

In other words, Eros and Thanatos are almost inevitably "alloyed" in

every human drive, each attempting to gain dominance over the other. In opposition to
the death instincts, Eros seeks to bring about "a more and more far-reaching combination
of the particles into which living substance is dispersed," and "aims at complicating life
and at the same time, of course, at preserving it."54 With this continuous struggle between
life and death, the early libido theory is thus transformed into the new dualism of Eros
and Thanatos.
As I argued in the previous section, the introduction of narcissism also brought
with it the concept of the "ego-ideal," or the superego. We recall that the superego is a
direct result of the Oedipus complex, in which the individual identifies with the father's
authority and establishes a moral tribunal against which he measures his own ego. By
virtue of its genesis in the Oedipus complex, this "superego" contains both erotic and

Freud explains that "the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it
contains the history of those object-choices. It must, of course, be admitted from the outset that there are
varying degrees of capacity for resistance, which decide the extent to which a person's character fends off
or accepts the influences of the history of his erotic object-choices." The Ego and the Id, tr. Joan Riviere,
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aggressive components. On the one hand, as Marcuse explains, "the superego builds up
and protects the unity of the ego, secures its development under the reality principle, and
thus works in the service of Eros."55 hi this sense, the superego takes on the protective
role of the father and sustains the ego in the face of external pressures.
On the other hand, the superego also takes on the father's punitive and aggressive
qualities. Freud argues that the ego manages the destructive rage of the superego by
directing it "towards the external world in the form of aggression."56 The paradigmatic
example here is sadism, in which the individual deflects her aggressiveness towards other
individuals. The case of sadism is significant in that it reveals the extent to which Eros
and the death instincts are "alloyed" with one another in every human drive. In one
respect, sadism is driven by the death instincts insofar as it involves harming individuals
and objects in the outside world. Yet this outwardly directed destructiveness also
prevents the ego from turning its aggression back upon itself; sadism is thus, in part,
"pressed into the service of Eros, inasmuch as the organism [destroys] other things, both
animate and inanimate, instead of itself."

This example supports Freud's view that the

manifestations of the life instincts are readily observable, whereas the death instincts are
largely a "mute" energy which can only be deciphered through their activities with
Eros.58
Often times, however, the superego directs its aggression against the ego and
"thus works in the service of the antagonist of the life instinct."59 Freud argues that "the
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more a man checks his aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe—that is
aggressive—he becomes in his ego ideal."6 The individual must either channel her
destructive energy towards the outside world or retain this aggression within herself at
the risk of self-torment and death. When the death instincts are directed towards the ego,
tension is created between the weakened ego and the ego-ideal. The superego establishes
the "conscience," which continuously reprimands the ego. Freud argues that the superego
is thus charged with destructive rage after the Oedipus complex and, in the extreme case
of melancholia, is permeated with "a pure culture of the death instinct."61
According to Ricoeur, the connection between the superego and the death
instincts in The Ego and the Id provides the foundation for Freud's "metacultural" theory
of Eros and Thanatos. Initially, Freud claims that the development and maintenance of
civilization is the work of Eros. Insofar as the life instincts bind individuals into everwider groups by creating strong libidinal ties between them, civilization is sustained and
enriched through the efforts of the life instincts. As Ricoeur aptly asserts: "[cjultural
development, like the growth of the individual from infancy to adulthood, is the fruit of
Eros and Ananke, of love and work."62 Thus, civilization is founded upon the necessity of
shared work and the power of Eros to bind individuals into tightly knit groups.
Although the development of civilization is largely the work of Eros, Freud also
emphasizes that the sexual instincts, "the part of Eros which is directed towards
objects,"6 cannot achieve complete fulfillment if society is to function most efficiently.
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Left to their own devices, the sexual instincts would drive the organism towards radically
individualistic modes of immediate gratification, which could undermine progress and
potentially dissolve the libidinal bonds of civilization. Private satisfaction and fulfillment
must be subordinated to the advancement of society as a whole—"[individual liberty is
not an asset of civilization."64 Therefore, the sexual instincts too must be restrained if
civilization is to function optimally.
On the basis of his earlier conjectures concerning the death instinct, Freud claims
that the work of Eros is now counteracted by an "anti-cultural" instinct. He argues that
"human beings are not gentle creatures in need of love, at most able to defend themselves
if attacked; on the contrary, they can account a powerful share of aggression among their
instinctual endowments."65 The death instinct thus finds its principal representative in
"the hostility of each against all and all against each,"66 which civilization must control in
various ways. Ideally, the life instincts are able to neutralize the death instincts by
"fusing" them with erotic components and pressing them into the service of Eros.
However, the demands of civilization force the individual to forego instinctual
gratification and thus prevent Eros from binding the death instincts. At this point, then, it
is necessary to explicate the ways in which the instincts are controlled at both the
individual and societal levels by briefly explicating the processes of repression and
sublimation.

Idem, Civilization audits Discontents, p. 42.
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SECTION 3: REPRESSION

As I have argued, the task of the unconscious is to "cathect" certain ideas, desires,
and instinctual impulses in order to discharge any unpleasurable excitations within the
psychical apparatus. The task of the preconscious—which lies between the unconscious
and conscious systems and regulates their interactions—is to establish "anti-cathexes" in
order to resist the instinctual energy of the id and to prevent certain unconscious impulses
from achieving discharge. Freud refers to this process of rejecting instinctual demands
and preventing them from entering consciousness as "repression." According to Freud,
"the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which
represents an instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious."67 hi his later work,
Freud claims that it is not the instincts themselves that are repressed—since an "instinct
can never become an object of consciousness"—but the ideas or impulses which
represent the instinct.

When such an ideational representative of instinct proves to be

incompatible with the reality principle, this idea meets with resistances and remain in an
unconscious state. Ultimately, Freud claims that "the essence of repression lies simply in
turning something away, and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious.''''
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In The Ego and the Id, Freud elucidates this process of repression in terms of his
second topography of ego, id, and superego. As we recall, the ego is merely an offshoot
of the id which emerges in response to the demands of external reality; it consists of both
unconscious and conscious elements. According to Freud, "the ego seeks to bring the
influence of the external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and endeavours to
substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle which reigns unrestricted in the
id."70 When the id makes an instinctual demand on the ego, the ego will either satisfy this
demand by allowing the impulse to achieve discharge or repress the impulse in order to
avoid any danger that might arise from its satisfaction. In this regard, the ego represses
certain instinctual demands due to "external" obstacles and dangers in the outside world.
In another respect, Freud argues that the ego carries out repressions for "internal"
reasons. It will be recalled that after the Oedipus complex the child internalizes his
father's authority through the formation of the superego. Since paternal authority
represents the greatest obstacle to the satisfaction of Oedipal desires, "the ego fortified
itself for the carrying out of the repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself."
This internal "standard" by which the ego measures itself influences the repressions that
the ego exacts upon the id. As Freud claims in Civilization and Its Discontents, the
"tension between the stern super-ego and the ego that is subject to it is what we call a
'sense of guilt'; this manifests itself as a need for punishment."72 In order to avoid the
experience of guilt, the ego is forced to carry out certain repressions at the behest of its
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superego. As such, the ego carries out repressions in order to avoid both external harm
and internal punishment.73
Despite the individual's efforts to repress certain impulses, Freud makes it clear
that the process of repression does not destroy the idea that represents an instinct. Indeed,
he claims that "the repressed exercises a continuous pressure in the direction of the
conscious, so that this pressure must be balanced by an unceasing counter-pressure."74
Freud enumerates several ways in which the repressed can penetrate into consciousness.
First, the repressed can surface when "the strength of counter-cathexis is diminished by
an illness which acts on the Ego." In this instance, the weakness of the ego prevents it
from opposing an instinctual demand, thus enabling the impulse to reach consciousness
and produce symptoms. This process also occurs in non-pathogenic forms in dreams and
phantasy. Second, the repressed can discharge its cathexis when "those instincts attached
to the repressed material become strengthened." This often occurs during the process of
puberty when the instincts—particularly the sexual instincts—become intensified.
Finally, Freud claims that the repressed can emerge when "recent events produce
impressions or experiences which are so much like the repressed material that they have
the power to awaken it."75 As I will argue in the next chapter, Marcuse believes that this
process of unearthing repressed impulses proves that the demands of the pleasure
principle and the repressed desire for freedom can reawaken through the work of
memory, imagination, and phantasy.

These "conscious and unconscious," "external and internal" modes of repression that Freud describes
will serve to justify Marcuse's broad definition of repression in Eros and Civilization.
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Freud discusses the "return of the repressed" at the phylogenetic level in relation
to his hypothesis of the primal crime. He claims that during the earliest phases of human
history—which he does not specify—human beings lived in hordes controlled and
regulated by a dominant male. The "strong male was the master and father of the whole
horde, unlimited in his power, which he used brutally."76 This "father" took possession of
the women and demanded the instinctual renunciation of the sons. If these sons "excited
the father's jealousy" by failing to check their appetitive drives, they were either "killed
or castrated or driven out." Spurred by their desire for freedom from the father, the excommunicated "brothers" came together, killed the father, and consumed his body.
Although the brothers initially fought amongst themselves to assume the father's
authority, they came to realize the futility of these disputes and established "a sort of
77

social contract."

Thus, they established the first form of social organization,

"accompanied by renunciation of instinctual gratification; recognition of mutual
obligations; institutions declared sacred, which could not be broken—in short, the
beginnings of morality and law."78
While the brothers carried out their desire for liberation by killing the father and
establishing social order, Freud claims that the sons experienced guilt over the primal
crime. Although the sons hated the father for demanding instinctual renunciation, the
father also provided for and sustained the entire clan and thus served as an example to be
revered.79 Later on, the sons would find a substitute for the father in the form of a totem
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animal. This animal reflected the sons' ambivalence towards the father: on the one hand,
the totem animal was "the corporeal ancestor and protecting spirit of the clan," which
they honoured and respected; on the other hand, the sons created a festival where the
animal would be killed and eaten, thus reaffirming the murder of the father.80 The sons'
guilt resulted from both the killing of the father who sustained them and his reappearance
in the totem animal, which represents their failure to overcome him in the end. In order to
eliminate their guilt over killing the master, the sons ultimately abandoned their project of
liberation by deifying the father and re-instituting his restrictions on instinctual
gratification.81
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud explicates the cultural modes of
repression and guilt-feeling in a way that mirrors the establishment of social order after
the primal horde. We recall that, for Freud, unrestrained satisfaction of the drives would
lead to purely individualistic modes of gratification and dissolve the bonds of civilization.
Accordingly, civilization demands the renunciation of pleasure in order to preserve
itself—it requires the subordination of the pleasure principle to the reality principle.
According to Freud, "[cjommunal life becomes possible only when a majority comes
together that is stronger than any individual and presents a unified front against every
individual."82 Just as the brother clan banded together against the tyranny of the father, so
too must the civilized community pit itself "against the power of the individual." The
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human community thus requires each individual to forego his or her desire for immediate
instinctual gratification "by suppression, repression or some other means."83
Yet Freud reminds us that the frustration of an instinctual demand cannot occur
without risk. By preventing the instincts from achieving full gratification, civilization
weakens the power of Eros to neutralize the destructive energies of the death instincts.
Recalling his earlier argument that Eros and Thanatos are alloyed with one another in
every human drive, Freud claims that "when a drive is repressed, its libidinal elements
are converted into symptoms and its aggressive components into a sense of guilt."
Elaborating upon his earlier arguments in The Ego and the Id, Freud now maintains that
civilization imposes guilt upon the individual in order to prevent the death instincts from
destroying the libidinal bonds upon which civilization depends. In this regard, "guilt is
now seen as the instrument which culture uses, no longer against the libido, but against
aggressiveness."

The superego is thus reinterpreted on the cultural plane; civilization

counters the aggressiveness of the individual "by weakening him, disarming him and
setting up an internal authority to watch over him, like a garrison in a conquered town."
By continuously reproducing the sense of guilt, civilization ensures that individuals will
"freely" repress their drives for instinctual gratification, which, in turn, contributes to the
"discontents" of civilization.
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SECTION 4: SUBLIMATION

As we have seen, repression is a continuous process by which certain instinctual
impulses are denied discharge through the establishment of anti-cathectic barriers. Since
this process deprives the instincts of gratification, Freud emphasizes that repression
cannot occur without offering compromise satisfactions, lest it lead to mental illness and
widespread "discontent." Accordingly, we turn now to Freud's notion of sublimation, the
other principal "vicissitude" of the instincts which shapes human desire and provides
satisfaction by diverting a drive towards non-sexual aims and objects. Unlike the other
concepts and dualisms I have elucidated thus far, sublimation has not undergone a
smooth and identifiable development in Freud's theory—or, perhaps more appropriately,
its development has not been as clear as the other concepts. As such, I shall limit myself
to a few key characteristics and examples of sublimation in order to lay the foundation
for Marcuse's critical application of this term.
In Instincts and their Vicissitudes, Freud claims that the sexual instincts can be
distinguished from the ego-instincts "by possessing the capacity to act vicariously for one
another to a wide extent and by being able to change their objects readily." As such, he
argues that the sexual instincts are "capable of functions which are far removed from
their original purposive actions—capable, that is, of 'sublimation.'"87 While the ego's
instincts of self-preservation express themselves as needs which must be fulfilled in order
to ensure the survival of the organism, the sexual instincts are more "flexible" in that they
are able to find various objects of satisfaction. Far from 'damming up' an instinctual

Idem, "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," p. 126.
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impulse by establishing anti-cathectic barriers and rendering it unconscious, as is the case
in repression, sublimation "neutralizes" the sexual energy of an instinctual impulse and
go

'channels' it "towards higher aims which are no longer sexual." Although this delay in
gratification lacks the intensity and pleasure of an immediate discharge, and thus involves
a temporary toleration of unpleasure, Freud argues that sublimation is merely a diversion
of instinctual strivings in accordance with the reality principle.
As I have argued above, the introduction of narcissism reveals that the ego is the
main reservoir of libido. In the case of secondary narcissism, object-cathexes are sent
back into the ego and the libidinal energy is converted into "ego-libido." In turn, Freud
argues, this narcissistic store of libido can be sent back out to the external world in order
to discharge its cathexis toward various objects. In The Ego and the Id, Freud explains
this conversion of object-libido into ego-libido as a type of sublimation. He argues that
this "transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place
obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization—a kind of
sublimation, therefore."89 In other words, the directly sexual strivings of object-libido are
neutralized, freeing up a portion of libido to be diverted along other paths to gratification.
Although this process involves the "displacement" of narcissistic libido towards nonsexual aims, Freud claims that this neutral energy, while being desexualized, "would still
retain the main purpose of Eros—that of uniting and binding—in so far as it helps
towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of
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the ego."

Thus, Freud describes the neutralization of object-libido as a sublimation of

drive energy which, in turn, provides the store of narcissistic libido required for future
sublimations in the form of object-cathexes.
Insofar as sublimation is the work of desexualized ego-libido, the process of
sublimating an instinct depends upon the formation of a mature ego. As Hans W.
Loewald points out, "in itself, sublimatory transformation of instinct seems indebted to
'civilizing' constraints coming from parents, models, teachers—in short, to educational
experiences in the broad sense."91 In this regard, sublimation presupposes an individual
who has undergone certain "basic" maturational developments and, correspondingly, the
repression of certain 'immature' modes of gratification.92 For instance, the "normal"
maturation of the individual through the oral, anal, and phallic stages of psychosexual
development results in the mature organization of the mind and body under the primacy
of "genitality." This process involves both the establishment of a fully developed ego
governed by the secondary process and the mature organization of a body capable of
"higher" pleasures. This organization of both the psychical and somatic apparatuses
enables an individual to divert his or her libido towards non-sexual modes of
gratification. Rather than completely repressing certain instinctual impulses, sublimation
involves the incorporation of these impulses "within the ego-organization by way of
channeling, organizing processes."
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In Freud's essay Leonardo da Vinci, which is perhaps his most detailed treatment
of sublimation, Freud identifies Leonardo's rejection of directly sexual strivings as a
paradigmatic instance of the sublimatory transformation of instinct. On his account,
Leonardo was not consumed by the desire for immediate sexual gratification. On the
contrary, he "appears to us as a man whose sexual need and activity were extraordinarily
low, as if a higher striving had raised him above the common animal need of mankind."94
Rather than seeking instinctual gratification through overtly sexual activity, Leonardo
"transmuted his passion into inquisitiveness" and allowed his tamed sexual energy to
"flow off freely like a branch of a stream."95 Although he underwent various stages of
necessary repression in early childhood, "the libido withdraws from the fate of the
repression by being sublimated from the outset into curiosity, and by reinforcing the
powerful investigation impulse."96 In this regard, sublimation depends upon the
'reversibility' of certain early childhood repressions which, in turn, liberates ego-libido
for non-sexual and socially useful strivings.
In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud argues that sublimation enables
individuals to overcome the inevitable pain and anxiety experienced under a repressive
civilization. He claims that a principal "technique for avoiding suffering makes use of the
displacements of the libido that are permitted by our psychical apparatus and lend its
functioning so much flexibility." Through this method, the individual attempts to
"displace the aims of the drives in such a way that they cannot be frustrated by the
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external world."

In this sense, sublimation allows individuals to seek more "civilized"

modes of gratification despite the pressures of the reality principle. Furthermore, Freud
seems to equate this vicissitude with the pursuit of "higher" pleasures and activities.
"Sublimation of the drives," he writes, "is a particularly striking feature of cultural
development, which makes it possible for the higher mental activities—scientific, artistic
•

and ideological—to play such a significant role in civilized life."

OS

In contradistinction to

non-human animals and our pre-civilized ancestors, human beings have the distinct
ability to overcome our basic appetitive desires by channeling our libidinal energy
towards "intellectual, scientific and artistic achievements," all of which are indispensable
elements of human civilization.
Although Freud does consider sublimation to be a distinctly human ability which
distinguishes us from other living beings, he identifies a flaw in the use of sublimation as
a means of avoiding suffering and pursuing higher pleasures. While Leonardo was able to
sublimate his sexual desire due to special environmental circumstances and favourable
predispositions,100 Freud believes that most individuals have neither the upbringing nor
the requisite mental constitution to sublimate their drives. He writes that sublimation
"presupposes special aptitudes and gifts that are not exactly common, not common
enough to be effective. And even to the few it cannot afford complete protection against
suffering; it does not supply them with an armour that is proof against the slings and
97
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arrows of fortune."

Accordingly, both the analyst and society itself contribute to

individuals' frustration by demanding that they sublimate their drives beyond their
capacities.
While this description may sound elitist—since the distinct human ability to
sublimate instinctual drives is now attributed to the most gifted individuals—I will argue
in the next section that Marcuse clarifies this concept and restores its usefulness through
his historicization of Freud's notion of repression. According to Marcuse, it is primarily
the unnecessary repressions demanded by a "surplus-repressive" civilization that stifle
individuals' ability to channel their instinctual energy in self-affirming ways. By
suggesting the possibility of eliminating these "surplus" modes of repression, Marcuse
believes that individuals will be able to express themselves more freely in a
fundamentally transformed society.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the concluding chapter of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud makes it clear
1 09

that his argument is intended neither as an indictment nor as a defence of civilization.
Rather, he claims that he is merely attempting to describe the "essence" of civilization
and the inevitable renunciations and delays in instinctual gratification that it demands of
its citizens. Considering the brute fact of "Ananke"—understood here in terms of the
scarcity of material resources and the necessity of shared work103-—Freud believes that
101
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civilized individuals must forego their instinctual desires and submit to the demands of
the reality principle. At best, those with favourable mental capacities and the proper
upbringing will be able to sublimate their libidinal impulses into the socially acceptable
channels left open to them. Considering the inevitability of repressive civilization, then,
Freud responds to both the "well-behaved and pious believers" who surrender to the
necessity of sexual repression and to the "wildest revolutionaries" who wish to overcome
it, that he "cannot bring them any consolation."104
The remainder of this essay will explore the theoretical and historical possibilities
of envisaging a "non-repressive" civilization by tracing the development of Marcuse's
critical theory of sexuality. Since Marcuse's critique of sexual repression in Eros and
Civilization oscillates between penetrating explications of psychoanalytic theory and his
own critical "extrapolation" of Freud's work, I can now consider Marcuse's unique
appropriation of psychoanalysis on its own terms. The point of this chapter has been to
elucidate the Freudian Bildungsmachte necessary to complete this task.

Ibid., p. 106.
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CHAPTER 2
MARCUSE'S CRITICAL APPROPRIATION OF FREUD: EROS AND
CIVILIZATION

According to Marcuse, "[t]he notion that a non-repressive civilization is
impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory."105 Indeed, Freud considers the reality
principle to be a "transhistorical" obstacle to the free gratification of human drives.106 In
this regard, Marcuse believes that Freud's theory seems to preclude the possibility of
envisaging a society that does not demand painful delays in gratification and the
subjugation of the individual's instinctual impulses to the reality principle. Yet Marcuse
argues that Freud comes to this conclusion by considering a specific historical form of the
reality principle to be the reality principle as such. Insofar as he does this, Freud fails to
recognize the extent to which the reality principle, as well as the repressions it demands,
can be consciously redirected through human agency.
Throughout Eros and Civilization, Marcuse offers several arguments for the
theoretical and historical possibility of a "non-repressive civilization." To begin with,
Marcuse claims that "Freud's own theory provides reasons for rejecting his identification
of civilization with repression."

On the one hand, Freud believes that there is an

"eternal" antagonism between instinctual gratification and the exigencies of reality,
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. However, on Marcuse's account,
Freud also reveals the fact that civilization depends upon the continuous reproduction of
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specific forms of repression. In the face of a society that could provide for the needs of its
citizens and allow a greater degree of gratification, civilization demands the sustained
repression of individuals' instinctual demands.
This reveals to Marcuse that the reality principle, far from being eternal and
unchanging, is constantly being recreated in the interest of dominating individuals and
controlling the scope of their desires. Insofar as Freud exposes the fact that the "highest
values and achievements of culture" are perpetuated through historically specific modes
of repression, then, Marcuse claims that "he denies the equation of reason with repression
on which the ideology of culture is built."
As we recall from the previous chapter, Freud also argues that the demands of the
pleasure principle retain their strength in the unconscious and can often penetrate into
consciousness despite the pressures of the reality principle.109 Considering these remarks,
Marcuse maintains that the pleasure principle is never completely repressed, but
"continues to exist in civilization" in the form of phantasies and dreams.110 Paraphrasing
Freud, he writes that "one mode of thought-activity is 'split off from the new
organization of the mental apparatus and remains free from the rule of the reality
principle: phantasy is 'protected from cultural alterations' and stays committed to the
pleasure principle."111 As such, Freud's own theory reveals that phantasy resists being
"educated" by the reality principle and that the repression of instinctual demands can be
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reversed. It is on the basis of this "hidden trend in psychoanalysis" that Marcuse finds the
theoretical possibility of envisaging a "non-repressive civilization."
In this chapter, I will attempt to 'come to terms' with Marcuse's historical
extrapolation of Freud by critically explicating his central concepts and considering a few
key objections to his position. In Section 1,1 will focus on Marcuse's notions of "surplusrepression" and the "performance principle," which he employs in order to historicize
Freud's concepts of repression and the reality principle, respectively. After explicating
these terms, I will explain why Marcuse believes that sublimation perpetuates surplusrepression under advanced industrial society.
In Section 2, I shall begin by briefly distilling Marcuse's arguments concerning
phantasy, imagination, and the aesthetic dimension. Although my discussion of these
ideas will be selective, my goal is to explain how he employs Freud's notions of phantasy
and imagination in order to envisage a new relationship between sensuousness and
reason, pleasure and reality. On this basis, I will elucidate his arguments regarding "nonrepressive sublimation" as a method by which individuals may channel their instinctual
desires in self-affirming ways under a fundamentally improved reality principle.
Lastly, Section 3 will focus on Marcuse's claim that the pursuit of instinctual
liberation necessarily involves a struggle against "time." After briefly responding to
Whitebook's arguments against Marcuse's interpretation of "primary narcissism," I will
attempt to answer Whitebook's question as to what he means when he advocates the
rejection of time. In this regard, I will offer two possible meanings of Marcuse's claim
that a qualitatively better reality principle necessitates a struggle against time and death.
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SECTION 1: SURPLUS REPRESSION AND THE PERFORMANCE PRINCIPLE

In the "Preface" to Eros and Civilization, Marcuse claims that he "employs
psychological categories because they have become political categories."

Insofar as

individuals are constituted and, in the present context, dominated by the society in which
they grow and develop, he believes that psychological processes are influenced by social
and political factors. Accordingly, Marcuse argues that "the Freudian terms, which do not
adequately differentiate between the biological and the socio-historical vicissitudes of the
instincts, must be paired with corresponding terms denoting the specific socio-historical
component."113 He thus begins his discussion by extrapolating several of Freud's basic
psychoanalytic concepts in a way that reflects the societal influence upon the individual's
psychical processes.
Marcuse argues that the instincts undergo certain modifications, repressions, and
deflections as a result of the external factors impressed upon them. As we recall, he
employs the Freudian notion of "instinct" to refer to the "primary drives" of the
individual, which are "subject to historical modification; they find mental as well as
somatic representation."114 Based on this definition, it is clear that Marcuse is relying
upon Freud's characterization of instinct in "Instincts and their Vicissitudes," in which he
claims that the instinct is the "psychical representative" of the bodily "source" of
impulses within the individual. Whereas the "aim" of an instinct is in every instance the
satisfaction of that impulse, the "object" of the instinct—either within or outside the
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body—is the "most variable" aspect of the instinct and is subject to change.115 On
Marcuse's account, then, "the reality which shapes the instincts as well as their needs and
satisfaction is a socio-historical world."116 Under advanced industrial civilization, he
believes that the instincts are unnecessarily repressed, modified, and deflected towards
certain objects in the interests of dominating the individual.
For his purposes, Marcuse defines repression "in the non-technical sense to
designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint,
constraint, and suppression."117 Recalling my explication of repression in the previous
chapter, Freud himself seems to provide some justification for Marcuse's broad definition
of repression. To begin with, Freud emphasizes the fact that the ego contains both
conscious and unconscious elements and that it carries out repressions as a result of both
the "internal" demands of the superego and the "external" obstacles in the outside world.
Furthermore, Marcuse's description of repression as "restraint, constraint, and
suppression," mirrors Freud's often loose descriptions of instinctual renunciation in his
later work. In Civilization and Its Discontents, for instance, Freud claims that civilization
"presupposes the non-satisfaction of powerful drives—by suppression, repression or
t 1 Q

some other means."

Thus, Freud's characterization of repression seems to lend itself to

Marcuse's revised definition of this term.
On the basis of his more comprehensive definition of repression, Marcuse
historicizes this concept further by distinguishing between "basic repression" and
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"surplus-repression." Whereas basic repression denotes "the 'modifications' of the
instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization," surplusrepression refers to the modes of restraint necessitated by a specific society bent on the
domination of human beings and the natural environment.119 By drawing this initial
conceptual distinction, Marcuse is able to differentiate between those modes of repression
which are indispensable to the survival of human life and those which unnecessarily
deprive individuals of instinctual gratification and material needs.
As Morton Schoolman correctly observes, the distinction between "basic and
surplus-repression" is modeled on Marx's distinction between "socially necessary and
surplus-labour."120 To put it briefly, Marx argues that socially necessary labour produces
"value," which takes the form of "exchange-value" and "use-value." While the exchangevalue of a product refers to "its trading power or ability to relate to other products on the
basis of embodied labor-time,"

use-value refers to the power of that product to satisfy a

human need.122 When workers produce value over and above what is required to sustain
both themselves and the means of production, they are said to produce "surplus-value,"
which takes the form of profit. However, rather than being returned to the workers on the
basis of how much surplus-value they create, this profit is hoarded by the owners of the
means of production. Accordingly, Marx refers to the labour required to produce surplusvalue as "surplus-labour," which denotes the unpaid labour required to produce additional
value for the capitalist alone.
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On the basis of this brief explication of Marx, it is clear that the notion of
"surplus-repression" is inspired by Marx's notion of "surplus-labour." Just as "surpluslabour" is the labour over and above what is required for the workers to sustain
themselves, "surplus-repression" involves the socially demanded renunciation of
instinctual impulses beyond what is required for the individuals' survival. In both cases,
individuals are forced to forego their life-satisfaction unnecessarily and without receiving
any additional benefit. Furthermore, "basic repression" is inspired by Marx's notion of
"socially necessary labour." Just as "socially necessary labour" refers to the work
required to sustain the individual and society itself, "basic repression" refers to the
instinctual renunciations necessary to ensure the individual's survival and the survival of
society as a whole.
The notion of "basic repression" reveals the extent of Marcuse's agreement with
Freud on the issue of instinctual renunciation. Insofar as civilization depends upon the
subordination of many instinctual desires to the exigencies of socially necessary labour, a
certain degree of "basic" repression will always be required. The crucial issue, however,
is whether or not the repression of an instinctual impulse deprives individuals of
satisfactions that civilization could grant without compromising its basic social
organization or the overall capabilities of individuals. On this point, Marcuse provides the
example of a young child who "feels the 'need' to cross the street any time at its will." In
this situation, he argues that the "repression of this 'need' is not repressive of human
potentialities."123 In other words, the demand that the child renounce his or her immediate
desire to cross the street is not employed in the interest of dominating him or her, but to
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equip this immature child with the means to survive in the face of external demands. In
this regard, Marcuse claims that basic repression is tantamount to the "rational exercise of
authority."124
Insofar as Marcuse concedes to Freud's view that civilization depends upon the
inhibition of certain drives, he also admits the existence of a "basic" reality principle. As
Joel Whitebook explains, Marcuse agrees that there is "a transhistorical dimension of the
human condition—a basic reality principle, as it were—but construes it in such a way as
to minimize its ultimate importance."125 In other words, he believes that there will always
be a "basic" reality principle, but he claims that it is not the most significant cause of the
unnecessary renunciation of desire enforced by civilization. While the basic reality
principle includes "the renunciation, however minimal, that will always be necessary to
negotiate the metabolism between humanity and external nature,"126 Marcuse argues that
the demands of the current reality principle extend beyond this basic minimum and
involve the thoroughgoing domination of all aspects of human life. He maintains that "the
specific historical institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of
domination introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civilized
human association."

These modes of "surplus-repression" fundamentally alter the

character of the reality principle itself.

Marcuse writes that the rational exercise of authority, "which is inherent in any societal division of
labor, is derived from knowledge and confined to the administration of functions and arrangements
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Marcuse labels the current historical form of the reality principle the
"performance principle" and argues that "under its rule society is stratified according to
the competitive economic performances of its members."128 Under the capitalist mode of
production, he argues, individuals are reduced to the "functions" they perform for an
apparatus that they do not control. Considering the fact that individuals spend the
majority of their waking lives labouring for a system that does not represent their
interests, their work is typically unsatisfying, toilsome, and alienating.129 As Theodor
Adorno so forcefully remarks in History and Freedom, which is perfectly appropriate
here, even those who have reached the greatest "heights" of the work world "cannot
enjoy their positions because even these have been whittled away to the point where they
are merely functions of their own function."130 Under the performance principle, then,
individuals come to internalize the demands of the capitalist labour system and accept the
"necessity" of unpleasurable labour.
While the technological and scientific achievements of advanced industrial
civilization have established the material preconditions for reducing the necessity of
toilsome labour, Marcuse claims that this society rationalizes the necessity of such labour
by appealing to "scarcity." On this view, the world is too poor in material and social
resources to provide for all the needs and capabilities of its citizens. Accordingly,
individuals must perform toilsome, alienated labour in order to overcome the "natural"
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scarcity of resources. In response, Marcuse claims that the material and social inequalities
in the advanced societies are "no longer due chiefly to the poverty of human and natural
resources but to the manner in which they are distributed and utilized."131 Indeed, in the
face of a society that could qualitatively improve human life on the basis of its existing
technological capabilities, the repressive distribution of scarcity is made to appear natural
and unavoidable. Inasmuch as this "natural" condition has been used to rationalize the
surplus-repressive organization of human life, Marcuse claims that "it has become
irrational."132
In order to ensure that individuals devote the majority of their waking lives to
performing their pre-established, alienated functions, Marcuse argues that the surplusrepressive "distribution of time" is also a fundamental element of the performance
principle: "[m]an exists only part-time, during the working days, as an instrument of
alienated performance; the rest of the time he is free for himself."133 Despite the fact that
this individual's free time could potentially be used for the attainment of pleasure,
Marcuse believes that the individual is prevented from achieving lasting instinctual
gratification by virtue of the sheer length of the working day itself. He claims that the
"tiresome and mechanical routine" of individuals' everyday, unfulfilling performances
"require that leisure be a passive relaxation and a re-creation of energy for work."134 If
repressed individuals are to derive any pleasure outside of work, these "passive" leisure
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activities are intended to temporarily rejuvenate the workers in order to prepare them for
toilsome labour.
Marcuse also emphasizes the extent to which the individual's pleasures and
satisfactions are efficiently coordinated with the dictates of the performance principle.
Already in the 1950s, Marcuse recognizes the ubiquity of the culture industry: "Not until
the late stage of industrial civilization.. .has the technique of mass manipulation
developed

an entertainment industry which directly controls leisure time."135

Accordingly, individuals are indoctrinated to associate pleasure and gratification with the
goods and services provided by the establishment. Every moment of the individual's life
is to be permeated not only with the beliefs and values of the performance principle, but
also with its comforts, commodities, and prescribed aspirations.136 As Douglas Kellner
explains, "if individuals are allowed to experience too much pleasure outside work, or
have too much time to question their alienated existence, they might perhaps revolt and
cause trouble, or drop out of the system."
Marcuse argues against this temporal reduction of the individual's potential for
pleasure by recalling Freud's argument concerning the "timelessness" of the id. As I
argued in the last chapter, Freud maintains that the id is "timeless" in the sense that its
attempt to satisfy instinctual impulses does not occur in any specific temporal sequence
and that temporal constraints do not affect its instinctual demands.138 At this point,
Marcuse adds that "the pleasure principle which governs the id is 'timeless' also in the
135
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sense that it militates against the temporal dismemberment of pleasure, against its
distribution in small separated doses."139 Under the performance principle, he argues,
individuals are trained to forget this demand for timeless gratification as an end in itself.
Instead, they are taught to treat pleasure as a mere means to the end of being better
prepared for labour.
In addition to the "temporal dismemberment of pleasure," Marcuse also discusses
the "spatial" reduction of pleasure through his extrapolation of Freud's notion of "genital
primacy." As I discussed briefly in the last chapter, Freud believes that the normal
maturation of the individual involves the movement through the oral, anal, and phallic
stages before culminating in the centralization of pleasure to the genitals. This is a
biological process which contains both psychic as well as somatic aspects: psychically, it
involves the maturation of the mental apparatus from the primary process to the
secondary process; somatically, it involves biological processes that eventually situate
pleasure in the genitals, which would occur in all conceivable civilizations.
Marcuse recognizes this "biological" necessity of the genital orientation of
pleasure. He claims that the "'containment' of the partial sexual impulses, the progress to
genitality belong to this basic layer of repression which makes possible intensified
pleasure," and, therefore, that "the maturation of the organism involves the normal and
natural maturation of pleasure."140 This maturational process enables the individual to
master the "partial" sexual impulses, which initially pursue gratification in radically
individualistic ways, by "fusing" them under the genital function. Thus, both Freud and
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Marcuse acknowledge that the maturation of the organism to genital primacy is a
necessary process which results in the establishment of a mature mind and body.
Yet Marcuse goes on to claim that throughout the history of civilization, "the
normal progress to genitality has been organized in such a way that the partial impulses
and their 'zones' were all but desexualized in order to conform to the requirements of a
specific social organization of the human existence."141 In this regard, Marcuse reveals
the surplus-repressive aspects of the centralization of pleasure to the genitals. Insofar as
the "basic" maturational progression to genitality is socially restricted to the "procreative
function"—which contains hetero-normative implications—and insofar as society
"taboos as perversions" virtually all manifestations of the sexual instincts that do not
prepare for genital intercourse, he believes that this process is surplus-repressive.
Considering his view that the basic progression to genitality is itself a "natural"
process, Marcuse maintains that the surplus-repressive "organization of sexuality"
introduces additional restrictions to this process over and above what is required for the
development of a mature individual. The socially imposed demand that sexual activity
must occur within the confines of monogamous, heterosexual relationships and the
requirement that any pleasure derived from this activity must be an inconsequential result
of the primary task of reproduction, are examples of the surplus-repressive organization
of sexual pleasure. According to Marcuse, such modes of surplus-repression "are added
to the basic (phylogenetic) restrictions of the instincts which mark the development of
man from the human animal to the animal sapiens."142 The societal constraints imposed
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upon the libido are necessitated by the performance principle in order to channel
individuals' libidinal energy into "socially useful performances."143 In this regard,
Marcuse argues that surplus-repression "achieves the socially necessary desexualization
of the body: the libido becomes concentrated in one part of the body, leaving most of the
rest free for use as the instrument of labor."
In response to this discussion of "genital supremacy," Morton Schoolman
dismisses Marcuse's argument by offering a "corrected" interpretation of Freudian
theory.145 Although he levels several attacks against Marcuse's interpretation and
appropriation of genitality, his principal argument is that Marcuse fails to appreciate the
strictly biological nature of Freud's argument. While he agrees that the centralization of
pleasure to the genitals "may have been enforced by the repressive mechanisms of the
performance principle" at the phylogenetic level, he claims that this historical process
eventually becomes "sedimented as biology."146 If this is the case, then the maturation of
the mind and body to genitality is no longer sustained through repression, but becomes
"human nature" proper.
On these grounds, Schoolman argues that Marcuse takes his historicization of
Freud too far. He claims that by "identifying the genital organization of the instincts with
repression, Marcuse means to imply that the maturation process that Freud believed to be
biological and irrevocable is actually social and potentially subject to conscious
redirection and control."147 In stating this, Schoolman implies that Marcuse has a problem
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with the development to genitality as such and, furthermore, that he is calling for the
complete reversal of genitality. To conclude this point, Schoolman argues that it is "not
possible to reverse the genital instinctual maturation and it makes little sense to equate
this event with a process of alienation supposedly open to social intervention."148
Although Schoolman is correct that the basic maturation of pleasure to the
genitals cannot be reversed, he falsely accuses Marcuse of believing that it can. The
fundamental error in Schoolman's assessment lies in his failure to appreciate the
distinction between basic and surplus repression, which he does not mention in his
critique of Marcuse's discussion of genital primacy. Far from arguing that the "basic"
repressive modification of the instincts can or should be reversed, Marcuse is claiming
that the societal organization of this basic maturational process introduces unnecessary
repressions into the individual's psychic and somatic development.149
When Schoolman does mention surplus-repression—after he has "corrected"
Marcuse's interpretation of Freud—his misinterpretation of Marcuse comes into full
view. He claims that, according to Marcuse, "genital 'repression,' the historical
catastrophe in each life that alters human nature to perform a lifetime of hard labor, is no
longer socially necessary and now is to be judged as surplus-repression."150 Again, at no
point does Marcuse suggest that the basic maturation of pleasure to the genitals as such is
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surplus-repressive. Rather, he believes that the "fusion" of the partial impulses becomes
surplus-repressive when their manifestations are completely tabooed by society. As Gad
Horowitz puts it: "Marcuse argues that the total renunciation of the desire for
gratification in non-genital zones of the body, except as 'forepleasure,' a prelude to
penis-in-vagina intercourse.. .is a result of surplus repression."151
According to Whitebook, Marcuse appears to be implying that the individual
undergoes "something like surplus genitalization," which is "superimposed on the
maturational process" by the division of labour and the demands of the patriarchal family.
However, Whitebook also claims that the biological nature of this process "tends to drop
out of his historicizing analysis, and the weight of his argument shifts almost completely
to the socially imposed stratum of repression."152 Accordingly, Marcuse argues that the
"socially necessary desexualization" of the body is a result of the hierarchical division of
labour and that the fusion of the partial instincts occurs in order to prepare the individual
for alienated labour. Nevertheless, Marcuse allows the basic repressive aspects of genital
primacy to "drop out" of his analysis because he has already made it clear that he is only
arguing against the surplus-repressive organization of sexual pleasure. Although Marcuse
is not always clear as to whether he is referring to basic repression or surplusrepression—primarily because he believes they have been "inextricably intertwined"
throughout the history of civilization—he does make it clear that he only objects to the
surplus-repressive organization of human life and that basic repression is unavoidable. 5
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As I mentioned, the surplus-repressions imposed on the basic maturation to
genitality also involve the "socially necessary desexualization" of the body.154 Like every
other object of Marcuse's critical scrutiny, his sustained indictment of desexualization
must also be understood in light of his distinction between basic and surplus-repression.
While desexualization may take on basic repressive or non-repressive forms, Marcuse
argues that socially necessary desexualization, which in this context means the
desexualization necessitated by a society governed by the performance principle, is
surplus-repressive. With this clarification in mind, we can begin to understand why
Marcuse believes that even sublimation can perpetuate surplus-repression under the
performance principle.
To begin, Marcuse argues that insofar as sublimation involves the socially
necessary desexualization of the sexual instincts, it also prevents Eros from controlling
the death instincts. He claims that "desexualization, by weakening Eros, unbinds the
destructive impulses. Civilization is thus threatened by an instinctual de-fusion, in which
the death instinct strives to gain ascendancy over the life instincts. 55 Yet, as I have
argued, Marcuse is not arguing against desexualization as such. Rather, he believes that
desexualization must be understood within the framework of the society in which it is
demanded. Under the performance principle, socially necessary desexualization results in
the total subjugation of the partial instincts to genitality, and of genitality to the
procreative function. Accordingly, sublimation rooted in this unnecessary desexualization
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of Eros prevents the individual's erotic energy from binding the destructive instincts and
thus perpetuates surplus-repression.156
Furthermore, considering Marcuse's argument that the performance principle is
characterized by surplus-repression, he believes that most forms of sublimation under late
capitalism are rooted in the unnecessary repression of the pleasure principle and the
instinctual drives which seek to satisfy it. He argues that the "repressive 'modification' of
the pleasure principle precedes the actual sublimation, and the latter carries the repressive
elements over into the socially useful activities."157 In this sense, although sublimation
and repression are two very distinct processes, Marcuse believes that sublimation serves
to perpetuate surplus-repression insofar as it is carried out by an unnecessarily repressed
individual in a fundamentally unfree society. As Horowitz nicely concludes, sublimation
"is surplus-repressive insofar as it is based on renunciation of desires which need not be
renounced for the sake of ego development or civilization per se."158

SECTION 2: FROM SEXUALITY TO EROS

On the basis of his extrapolation of Freud's theory, Marcuse attempts to reveal the
historical and theoretical possibilities of establishing a fundamentally improved
relationship between pleasure and reality, sensuousness and reason. By revealing both the
socio-historical content of the contemporary reality principle and the specific modes of
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surplus-repression that characterize advanced industrial civilization, he attempts to
provide support for the possibility of a civilization without unnecessary repression.
Although every society will inevitably require a certain degree of "basic" instinctual
renunciation, Marcuse argues that the technological and scientific achievements of late
capitalism could provide for the increased satisfaction of human needs while substantially
reducing the need for unnecessary instinctual restraint. As he remarks: "the very
achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the preconditions for the gradual
abolition of repression."159
Recalling his earlier arguments concerning the power of phantasy to uphold the
tabooed aspirations of the pleasure principle, Marcuse now attempts to show how this
mental faculty can be effective in pointing to the necessity of a non-repressive reality
principle. As we have seen, Freud argues that the conversion of the pleasure ego into the
reality ego "splits" the mental apparatus into reality-testing and phantasy. On this basis,
Freud draws a distinction between "the sexual instincts and phantasy" and "the ego
instincts and the activities of consciousness."160 By virtue of this separation, Marcuse
argues that while the ego interprets, manipulates, and transforms reality, phantasy is
relegated to the unconscious and thus becomes unrealistic and powerless.
At this point, Marcuse reveals that phantasy can become a significant source of
social change through "the incorporation of phantasy into artistic (and even normal)
consciousness."161 He argues that phantasy can manifest itself consciously through the
work of "imagination" while retaining its close affinity with the sexual instincts. In this
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respect, "phantasy has a truth value of its own, which corresponds to an experience of its
own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality."162 This truth lies in its
memory of the original unity between the two divisions of the mind—the integral
connection between phantasy and the reality-testing ego before their differentiation.
Insofar as it is able to retain this memory and manifest itself in conscious forms through
the work of imagination in art, phantasy points to the possibility of a fundamentally new
reality principle that unifies integral instinctual gratification with the exigencies of the
external world.
Based on the power of the imagination to consciously express the demands of the
forgotten pleasure principle, Marcuse attempts to identify the '"culture-heroes' who have
persisted in imagination," and who might point beyond the existing reality principle.
First, he identifies Prometheus as the culture-hero of the performance principle. He
claims that Prometheus "symbolizes productiveness, the unceasing effort to master life;
but, in his productivity, blessing and curse, progress and toil are inextricably
intertwined."

Considering the fact that surplus-repression and alienated labour grow

stronger the more unnecessary they become, Prometheus symbolizes this same fateful
dialectic of contemporary civilization.
As such, Marcuse looks for the polemical counter-images of this repressive reality
principle, which he finds in Orpheus and Narcissus. On the one hand, Orpheus pacifies
the animals and trees in the forest through song and, in doing so, unites these living
beings through the experience of joy.164 He thus rejects the repressive organization of
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human life in favour of music and satisfaction. However, the fact that Orpheus is
"nothing but a harp player" does not mean that he is incapable of performing work.
Rather, as Horowitz explains, "it means that the central meaning and purpose of his life is
gratification."165
On the other hand, Narcissus becomes captivated by his own image in the stream
"in which all forms pass and flee," the river of change and becoming.166 He attempts to
arrest the flow of time and change in order to capture his own beauty, which Marcuse
interprets as the rejection of the repressive organization of time. In this regard, Narcissus
symbolizes sleep and death, the triumph of the "static" over the "dynamic."167 Yet this
does not suggest that Narcissus abandons Eros in favour of the death instincts; he "lives
by an Eros of his own," which establishes an indissoluble bond between himself and the
external world.168
Both Orpheus and Narcissus represent the "Great Refusal" of the established
reality principle: "theirs is the image of joy and fulfillment; the voice which does not
command but sings; the gesture which offers and receives; the deed which is peace and
ends the labor of conquest; the liberation from time which unites man with god, man with
nature."169 Furthermore, both protest against the repressive organization of pleasure, not
by abandoning erotic strivings, but by attempting to achieve a "fuller Eros."170 This fuller
Eros captures dimensions of erotic gratification that have been repressed under the
performance principle. Through these images, then, gratification is transformed from a
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"part-time" leisure activity operating within the confines of surplus-genitality, to integral
instinctual fulfillment in an environment of freedom and unity.
On the basis of these two images, Marcuse finds new significance in Freud's
notion of primary narcissism. Returning to the first chapter of Civilization and Its
Discontents, he argues that primary narcissism denotes not only the denial of reality and
the infantile auto-eroticism that must be overcome in order to establish a mature ego, but
also as a deeper connectedness with the outside world. He reveals the "striking paradox
that narcissism, usually understood as egotistic withdrawal from reality, here is connected
with oneness with the universe."171 Although Freud is critical of this "oceanic feeling,"172
Marcuse finds in primary narcissism and the oceanic feeling the possibility of a new
existential relation to reality. He argues that "beyond all immature autoeroticism,
narcissism denotes a fundamental relatedness to reality which may generate a
comprehensive existential order."173 Thus, primary narcissism could be the key to
establishing a deeper affinity between individuals and the natural and social environment.
After identifying Orpheus and Narcissus as the images of another reality
principle, Marcuse returns to the critical role of imagination by recapturing the traditional
function of the "aesthetic dimension." To begin, he attempts to invalidate the notion that
the aesthetic dimension, like the imagination, refers exclusively to an unrealistic realm
that cannot be "lived" in reality. Under the rule of a repressive reality principle, reason
comes to prevail over the demands of the senses and the latter are deprived of their
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critical function.

This radical disarticulation of the "aesthetic" from concrete social life

is the result of a "cultural repression" of those "contents and truths that are inimical to the
performance principle."175
In order to bridge this gap between the "aesthetic" and reality, Marcuse turns to
the aesthetic theories of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. For Kant and Schiller, the
"aesthetic aims at a realm which preserves the truth of the senses and reconciles, in the
reality of freedom, the 'lower' and the 'higher' faculties of man, sensuousness and
intellect, pleasure and reason."176 On Kant's view, "judgement" mediates between the
faculties of sense and knowledge, nature and freedom.

The "aesthetic dimension" is the

realm in which these two faculties meet and achieve reconciliation through the
"imagination."
Schiller, proceeding from Kant, also seeks to unite the demands of the senses and
the intellect. He argues that a conflict arises between the "play impulse" and the "form
impulse." Whereas the "play impulse" is the demand for sensuous gratification from the
external world, the "form impulse" refers to the individual's rational faculty, which
establishes scientific and moral laws. Marcuse claims that Schiller's Aesthetic Education
"aims at basing morality on a sensuous ground; the laws of reason must be reconciled
with the interest of the senses."178 Through this reconciliation, toilsome labour is
transformed into "play," the gratification of the individual's sensuous needs, while
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repressive productivity becomes the free "display" of human faculties.

Thus, both Kant

and Schiller point to the reconciliation of reason and sensuousness, nature and freedom.
In order to open the horizon for a new reality principle on the basis of this
theoretical reconciliation of sensuousness and reason, Marcuse turns to the concrete
changes required to create a qualitatively improved civilization. To begin, he argues that
the specific social and political institutions of the performance principle must be
overcome. As John David Ober puts it, "men living under different social, political, and
economic conditions might in turn create freer institutions under which the need for
repression would greatly diminish."180 This depends, first of all, on the reduction of
socially necessary labour time to a basic minimum. Since the sheer length of the working
day imposes unnecessary restrictions on pleasure, the shortening of the working day is
"the first prerequisite of freedom."181
Under a new reality principle, Marcuse claims that the standard of living as it is
typically conceived would decrease, while the quality of life would improve. Although
this society would be able to provide for human needs on an ever-expanding scale, he
claims that "many would have to give up manipulated comforts if all were to live a
human life."182 It would thus require a new standard of living that measures social
progress and freedom on human need-satisfaction and capability development, as well as
on the absence of extraneous modes of libidinal renunciation. Furthermore, this society
would require the minimization of waste and over-consumption. Beyond the rule of the
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performance principle, Marcuse claims that "the level of living would be measured by
other criteria: the universal gratification of the basic human needs, and the freedom from
guilt and fear."183
This quantitative reduction of labour time, wasteful consumption, and other
modes of surplus-repression would lead to a "resexualization" of the body. Again,
resexualization here must be understood as the reversal of those surplus-repressive modes
of desexualization that confine sexual pleasure to the genitals and reduce sexual activity
to the heterosexual, procreative function. "The re-erotization of the body," Horowitz
explains, "means a heightened capacity for genital as well as non-genital pleasure,
because surplus repression.. .cripples all the erotogenic zones, including the genitals."184
Indeed, as we recall, Marcuse accepts the inevitability of the "basic" repressive
organization of the body and mind under the genital function, while dismissing only its
surplus-repressive aspects.
Such a reversal of surplus-repression would reactivate "polymorphous perversity"
in the sense that the surplus-repressive organization of sexuality would be overcome.
"This regression," Marcuse writes, "would be psychical as well as social: it would
reactivate early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the development of the
reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which the reality ego
exists."185 Yet this process would not involve a complete regression to infantile forms of
psychic and somatic organization. During these early stages, the child is not yet able to
differentiate between self and other and, therefore, cannot take the needs and desires of
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others into account. Furthermore, in this phase the sexual instincts strive for gratification
in individualistic ways and are not yet fully organized under the genital function. As
such, Marcuse wishes to recapture the experience of "polymorphous" modes of
gratification in all "zones" of the body, while retaining the mature organization of the
mental and somatic apparatuses.
In order to clarify Marcuse's position, I propose that we adopt Horowitz's
interpretation of "polymorphous perversity" as "polymorphous

genitality." On

Horowitz's account, this concept refers to "genitality that combined psychically genital
object relations with freedom of expression for the pregenital component instincts within
a genital organization of libido."186 In this way, we can clarify the fact that Marcuse
wishes to preserve the "basic" repressive elements of the genital organization—the
development of a mature mind and body for the reception of greater pleasures—while
eliminating the surplus-repressive "organization" of genitality under the performance
principle. Rather than arguing for the complete abolition of the genital function and its
ability to "fuse" the sexual instincts, Marcuse believes that the "partial" sexual impulses
must be "fused" without precluding their manifestations entirely.
This reactivation of "polymorphous genitality" would lead to higher pleasures for
the entire body and "eroticize" social relations more generally. It would activate
previously tabooed zones and sexual relations in order to enhance individuals' capacity
for libidinal gratification. "However," Marcuse writes, "the process just outlined involves
not simply a release but a transformation of the libido: from sexuality constrained under
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genital supremacy to eroticization of the entire personality."

The individual's entire

body, as well as the broader material and social relations, would become objects of
libidinal cathexis. Individuals would then treat the attainment of pleasure as the central
meaning and purpose of their lives, while also being capable of performing the "socially
necessary" labour and instinctual restraint needed to preserve society as a whole.
Under improved material and social conditions, sexuality would tend to "grow
into Eros": it would progress from "mere sexuality," which is converted into a means to
the end of procreation, to the "life instinct" as the unifying force which binds organic life
into ever greater unities. Reason would then be shaped by the demands of Eros in the
wider sense and give way to a new form of "sensuous rationality." In turn, the natural and
social environment would be fashioned in accordance with the demands of the life
instincts rather than being constrained, mastered, and dominated by the repressive reason
of the performance principle.
With the conversion of "sexuality into Eros" on the basis of fundamentally
transformed institutions and social relations, sublimation would no longer serve to
perpetuate the surplus-repressive organization of human life. Rather, Marcuse claims that
Eros would strive towards life-enhancing modes of "non-repressive sublimation" in an
environment of freedom. He argues that "its fully developed form would be sublimation
without desexualization." Again, this does not suggest that all desexualization must be
abolished in order to achieve non-repressive modes of sublimation. Indeed, recalling
Freud's notion of narcissism, Marcuse agrees with Freud that sublimation occurs on the
basis of transforming "object-libido" into desexualized "ego-libido," which is then sent
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out into the external world in order to attain "higher" forms of gratification.188 On this
basis, he argues that an eroticized social environment would eliminate surplus-repressive
modes of desexualization and liberate libidinal energy for the pursuit of "activities and
relations that are not sexual in the sense of 'organized' genital sexuality," but which are
nonetheless "libidinal and erotic."189
As we recall, Freud himself believes that sublimation leads to "higher" forms of
gratification in the face of the necessary renunciations demanded by civilization.
However, Marcuse argues that this type of sublimation operates on an individual who has
been preconditioned to achieve limited instinctual gratification on a "part-time" basis,
outside the parameters of alienated labour. In this case, individuals are only "free" to
pursue instinctual gratification through the pre-established channels left open to them,
while leaving the surplus-repressive performance principle intact. Under an improved
reality principle, in which the demands of the pleasure principle are reconciled with the
exigencies of non-alienated labour, individuals would be able to sublimate their libidinal
energy in a non-repressive, "eroticized" environment. Libido would then take the road of
"self-sublimation" under "conditions which relate associated individuals to each other in
the cultivation of the environment for their developing needs and faculties."190
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SECTION 3: MARCUSE ON TIME

According to Marcuse, the establishment of a non-repressive reality principle
necessitates the "conquest of time in so far as time is destructive of lasting
gratification."191 Under the performance principle, individuals are only able to achieve
pleasure outside the demands of alienated labour. Even beyond their work relations,
individuals' potential for pleasure is limited by the prescribed enjoyments of the
entertainment industry and the mass media. As we recall, Marcuse evokes the image of
Narcissus to symbolize the "Great Refusal" against this repressive organization of time
and the limitations it places on the attainment of integral instinctual gratification.
Narcissus is able to halt the "flux of time" by striving to achieve a "fuller Eros" which
establishes an indissoluble bond between himself and the external world. On Marcuse's
account, by reducing the amount of socially necessary labour time and improving the
quality of work relations on the basis of this deeper connectedness with external reality—
a reactivation of "primary narcissism"—individuals will be able to overcome the
repressive organization of time.
In response to this argument, Joel Whitebook challenges Marcuse's discussion of
time along a number of lines. To put it briefly, he claims that although "narcissism may
point to a more connected, less distanced relation to reality in a perhaps overly
oedipalized and scientized world," narcissism also involves the omnipotent denial of both
the inevitable losses of early childhood and of external reality itself. Freud's notion of
"Ananke," then, refers not only to "scarcity," but also to the "ineluctable," or the
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unavoidable passage of time and the necessary losses and frustrations that result from
it.

It is only by overcoming these inescapable failures and losses in early childhood that

the individual is able to master "infantile omnipotence," which involves the inability to
distinguish between self and other and to consider the needs of individuals outside
oneself. Therefore, by advocating the return to primary narcissism, Whitebook claims
that Marcuse's position could potentially lead to the omnipotent denial of time and loss.
Furthermore, Whitebook claims that Marcuse's "casual minimalization" of the
Oedipus complex ignores the principal way in which this "infantile omnipotence" is
overcome. Since the Oedipus complex results in the establishment of a superego that
controls the ego and demands the repression of id impulses, this process is crucial for the
development of a mature individual capable of "decentering" infantile omnipotence and
dealing with the inevitable frustrations of the external world. Thus, without an
"alternative means of taming infantile omnipotence," Marcuse fails to provide an
adequate method of ensuring that the individual will develop a strong ego capable of
handling frustration and loss.
Although Whitebook is correct that Marcuse does minimize the "dark side" of
narcissism, it should be stressed that Marcuse does acknowledge that narcissism is
"usually understood as egotistic withdrawal from reality,"193 and emphasizes that he is
not advocating a complete "regression" to infantile omnipotence. Rather, he advocates a
return to "primary narcissism" in order to emphasize the need to establish a more vital
connection between human beings and the external world. On this point, Horowitz claims
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that Marcuse is not describing "a simple regression but a dialectical one, a regression
under the control of and in the service of the ego."194 In this regard, the reactivation of
primary narcissism would involve a cancellation of the antagonistic relation between
individuals and their natural and social environment, a preservation of both the mature
ego organization and society's technological capabilities, and the establishment of a
higher unity between human beings and the external world. This experience of "oneness"
with reality would then motivate individuals to create both a more enriching natural and
social environment and qualitatively better working conditions.
Furthermore, with regards to Whitebook's second point, it is true that Marcuse
minimizes the Oedipus complex. However, this is likely due to his observation that the
family has lost its traditional role in the socialization process. Indeed, Marcuse recognizes
the critical role of the Oedipus complex in forming a fully developed "individual" with a
mature ego. Yet he also believes that the socializing function of the family has been
replaced by the direct control of individuals by the mass media, schools, and other social
groups.195 In this regard, his minimization of the Oedipus complex results from the
historical trends that have rendered this method of decentering infantile omnipotence
obsolete, rather than from a denial of its importance.196
With these clarifications in mind, we can now begin to understand what Marcuse
means by the "conquest of time." First, Marcuse is not advocating the rejection of time as
such, but only the repressive organization of time under the performance principle. He
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argues that "[i]t is the alliance between time and the order of repression that motivates the
efforts to halt the flux of time, and it is this alliance that makes time the deadly enemy of
Eros."197 Since individuals are forced to spend the majority of their waking lives
performing alienated labour, they do not have the time and energy to imagine the
possibility of achieving more complete forms of gratification beyond the order of
repression. In this sense, "the flux of time helps men to forget what was and what can be:
it makes them oblivious to the better past and the better future."198 Although time remains
a necessity, Marcuse believes that the reduction of unnecessary labour and the qualitative
improvement of working conditions will afford individuals more time for lasting
fulfillment in an environment of freedom.
Marcuse's argument against the repressive flux of time is also illuminated by his
claim that the life instincts necessarily militate against death, since "death is the final
negativity of time."199 Just as the establishment uses the brute facts of "time" and
"scarcity" as a rationalization for their surplus-repressive distribution and organization,
he believes that the fact of death serves to justify even the most horrific of deaths:
"[wjhether death is feared as constant threat, or glorified as supreme sacrifice, or
accepted as fate, the education for the consent to death introduces an element of surrender
into life from the beginning - surrender and submission."200 In this sense, the struggle
against death would not seek to deny that it is a necessity, but to make death more
tolerable by reducing the amount of unnecessary pain that accompanies it. "Like the other
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necessities," he writes, "it can be made rational - painless. Men can die without anxiety if
they know that what they love is protected from misery and oblivion."201 Thus, a
fundamentally improved reality principle would seek to bring both time and death into
the service of life, rather than allowing life to be controlled and determined by these
necessities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As we have seen, Marcuse ventures beyond the Freudian equation of civilization
with repression by revealing the historical and theoretical possibilities of a fundamentally
new relationship between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. By releasing the
power of Eros to bind life into ever-greater unities through "self-sublimation," he
believes that civilization could potentially overcome the surplus-repressive channeling of
instinctual impulses and create a qualitatively improved natural and social environment.
Yet Marcuse also begins to recognize the historical trends that counteract the
development of this "non-repressive civilization." Although the technological capacities
of advanced industrial society have created the conditions for the abolition of poverty,
toil, and unnecessary instinctual restraint, they are actually being used to establish more
efficient mechanisms of domination. With the rise of the mass media, the advertising
industry, and the escalation of commodity production and exchange, the societal controls
begin to permeate the private sphere and shape the individual's drives and needs. On the
basis of this preconditioning, society is able to grant more sexual "liberties" to its
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citizens. Recognizing this developing trend, Marcuse argues that "the relaxed sexual
morality within the firmly entrenched system of monopolistic controls itself serves the
system."

By numbing the human faculties through controlled sexual liberties, this

society reinforces its power over all dimensions of human life. It is precisely this trend
which will characterize Marcuse's later work, to which we turn now.
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CHAPTER3
THE CONTAINMENT OF SEXUALITY IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL SOCIETY

In One-Dimensional Man and throughout his subsequent thought, Marcuse
continues his thoroughgoing critique of the repressive affluence of contemporary
capitalist society by addressing the emerging social trends that he has briefly discussed in
Eros and Civilization. Whereas his earlier critique of sexual repression focuses primarily
on the repressive sublimation of libidinal energy into socially useful and unpleasurable
labour, his later work focuses on a new set of trends: the relaxation of sexual taboos, the
incorporation of sexual expression into the work place, and the exploitation of sexuality
in advertising and the mass media. Far from liberating the individuals from alienated
labour and surplus-repression, this system is now able to tolerate a greater degree of
sexual liberty as a concession in order to stifle the individual's capacity "to recognize the
disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease."

Accordingly,

sublimation has been replaced by "desublimation," the immediate discharge of sexual
energy within a system of effective, ubiquitous controls.
In this final chapter, I intend to explicate this notion of "repressive desublimation"
through a close examination of One-Dimensional Man and An Essay on Liberation. In
Section 1, I will begin by highlighting several of Marcuse's key concepts. I shall
elucidate his argument that the current advanced industrial apparatus is able to "contain"
any and all transcendent modes of thought and creativity by neutralizing their
oppositional force and pressing them into the service of the established order. This will
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lead into a discussion of "technological rationality," the dominant "dimension" of thought
which serves to delegitimate the other subversive forms of thought and experience under
late capitalism. Finally, I will explicate Marcuse's distinction between "false needs" and
"vital needs" in order to reveal the ways in which human beings become dependent upon
the commodities, services, and prescribed aspirations provided by the establishment.
In Section 2, I will begin by elucidating Marcuse's arguments concerning
"repressive desublimation" in the cultural sphere, where previously transgressive works
of art are being assimilated to the requirements of capitalist production and consumption.
According to Marcuse, this process of containment reveals the extent to which
"technological rationality" comes to prevail over all opposition under late capitalism. On
this basis, I shall discuss Marcuse's argument that the sexual instincts undergo the
process of repressive desublimation through the manipulation of human needs and drives
and the incorporation of libidinal components into the work world. Lastly, I will explicate
Marcuse's claim that these sexual liberties numb the human faculties and weaken the
"rationality of protest."
In Section 3, I will examine Marcuse's "The Obsolescence of the Freudian
Concept of Man" in order to account for the destructiveness that accompanies repressive
desublimation. To begin, I will explain Marcuse's argument that repressive desublimation
weakens Eros and, in turn, releases destructive energy. I shall then explicate his reasons
for suggesting that the individual no longer undergoes the same processes of maturation
as the traditional psychoanalytic subject and why this results in the willingness to
conform to the beliefs and values of the current system. On these grounds, I shall argue
that both the weakness of the ego to resist the repressive society and the inability of Eros
78

to bind the destructive instincts, account for the aggression that accompanies repressive
desublimation.

SECTION 1: TECHNOLOGICAL RATIONALITY AND CONTAINMENT

Developing his earlier arguments in Eros and Civilization, Marcuse maintains that
the technological achievements of advanced industrial civilization have created the
conditions for the complete abolition of toil, hunger, and poverty on a global scale.
However, in the face of this potential for liberation, society mobilizes itself against the
specter of a world where all basic needs could be satisfied for the free play of human
faculties and capabilities. He writes: "[fjaced with the possibility of pacification on the
grounds of its technical and intellectual achievements, the mature industrial society closes
itself against this alternative."204 Rather than being used to beautify the natural and social
environment and to provide for basic human needs, the current technological capacities
have been employed to produce superfluous commodities, military weapons, and other
mind-numbing and destructive products. In Marcuse's terms, the productive forces are
effectively "contained" and pressed into the service of the repressive system.
This notion of "containment" also applies to the individual's potential for critical
thought, experience, and action under the capitalist system. As we recall, Marcuse argues
that "phantasy" can be expressed consciously through the work of imagination in artistic
creation. In this way, artists have the ability to recall the forgotten demands of the
pleasure principle and to illuminate the ways in which reality might be improved.
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However, he now claims that this faculty has been effectively neutralized and
impoverished by the advanced civilization: "[t]he order and organization of class society,
which have shaped the sensibility and the reason of man, have also shaped the freedom of
the imagination."

In this regard, the imagination becomes bound to the repressive

system and its realization is made to coincide with the dictates and interests of the
establishment.
For instance, the individual's imaginative capacities are now used to find more
creative ways of exploiting the masses through advertising and the mass media.
Furthermore, rather than being employed to envisage a better life for all individuals, the
imagination becomes a valuable asset for the creation of bigger and better weapons and
military strategies. The established society now appreciates imagination and creativity
only insofar as they can be manipulated and employed in the interests of dominating
human beings and nature in more effective ways. Thus, the imagination is "free to
become practical, i.e., to transform reality only within the general framework of
repression."206
It should be stressed, however, that Marcuse does observe counter-tendencies to
the repression of imagination. With the emergence of strong radical groups in the 1960s,
he begins to identify many forms of political protest and refusal that attempt to articulate
the values and truths of the "negative," oppositional dimension of thought and
experience. For instance, he argues that the black radical movements in the United States
represent a "Great Refusal" against the established system by redefining various words
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and images that had previously expressed the interests and beliefs of the dominant social
groups. The term "soul" no longer refers to the "lily-white" soul of the established
system, but becomes "black, violent, orgiastic," thus representing the struggle of the
marginalized.207 Similarly, the nonconformist youth and student radicals use "flower
power" as a method of resistance against the oppressive forces of the establishment,
converting a beautiful image into a symbol of opposition. These rebellious groups protest
not only against the ugliness, persecution, and destructiveness of this society, but also
against its notions of beauty, imagination, and freedom.208 Thus, Marcuse turns to the
marginalized and oppressed as a possible site of opposition against the established order.
Yet even these movements are made to "operate" in the service of the
establishment through the "containment" of their images and symbols within the
framework of commodity production and consumption: subversive art is sold by
transnational corporations; clothing and accessories containing images of revolutionary
political figures are manufactured and distributed in order to make a profit; and
previously tabooed sexual activities are encouraged and exploited. Under the advanced
industrial apparatus, "transcendent" modes of thought and activity are made ineffectual
by being assimilated to the totalizing system of domination. On Marcuse's account, this
society can afford to tolerate virtually any transgressions, including those in the sexual
sphere, by neutralizing their ability to pose a real threat to the repressive social order.
This incorporation of the "negative," oppositional dimension of thought and experience
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results in a "one-dimensional" society dominated by what Marcuse labels "technological
rationality."
On Marcuse's account, "technological rationality" denotes a "dimension" of
thought by which the establishment operationalizes all aspects of material and social life;
human relations are reduced to calculated exchanges between alienated labourerconsumers and the value of any idea or practice is determined by its ability to contribute
to the continued functioning of the apparatus. Although human beings have been able to
control the forces of nature to an unprecedented extent by employing this form of
scientific, operational thinking, technological rationality eventually functions as the
paradigmatic mode of thought. Accordingly, the establishment that employs it either
incorporates dissent and opposition or, if they are perceived as a threat to the system,
dismisses them as irrational. In this regard, technological rationality "becomes the great
vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and
nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of
this universe."209
In order to ensure that the individual's critical capacities are effectively
"contained," Marcuse argues that this society also produces and endorses the
consumption of superfluous commodities, which individuals come to internalize as their
own needs. On this basis, he now distinguishes between "false needs" and "vital needs."
Vital needs refer the material and social resources indispensable to the sustained
functioning of the individual and society as such. According to Marcuse, the "only needs
that have an unqualified claim for satisfaction are the vital ones—nourishment, clothing,
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lodging at the attainable level of culture."

Thus, "vital needs" are the "basic"

requirements needed to sustain human life.
This is not to suggest, however, that these basic needs for food, clothing, and
shelter are the only needs human beings have. Indeed, the early Marx also reminds us of
the "spiritual," or distinctly human needs that separate human beings from other animals.
For instance, Marx describes the "objects of art" as the human being's "spiritual
inorganic nature, spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and
digestible."211 Likewise, while Marcuse believes that vital needs are the only needs with
an unqualified claim for fulfillment—that is, they must be satisfied in order to ensure our
survival and thus require no further justification for their satisfaction—their fulfillment is
•

•
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also "the prerequisite for the realization of all needs."
False needs, on the other hand, are "those which are superimposed upon the
individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil,
aggressiveness, misery, and injustice."213 These include the "need" for mindless
comforts, gadgets, and leisure activities created by the culture industry, the "need" to
consume wasteful products, and so on.214 Although they might afford the individual some
degree of pleasure, Marcuse argues that these "needs" should not be preserved if they
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numb individuals' mental faculties and prevent them from recognizing the repressive
character of their society.215
Furthermore, these needs are considered "false" when they are promoted in the
interest of limiting the greater potentialities and freedoms of human beings. In An Essay
on Liberation, Marcuse argues that under the influence of these administered needs,
individual autonomy "asserts itself in the right to race his automobile, to handle his
power tools, to buy a gun, to communicate to mass audiences his opinion, no matter how
ignorant, how aggressive, it may be."

Again, some of these activities might be

enjoyable to a certain degree, but they become "false" if they are the sole means of
expressing individual autonomy. By identifying themselves with these prescribed needs,
individuals become dependent upon the goods and services that promote conformity and
submission to the repressive system. In turn, the interests of the establishment become the
innermost drives and aspirations of the individuals.

SECTION 2: REPRESSIVE DESUBLIMATION

Considering both the mass dissemination of prescribed needs and the power of
containment to neutralize the individual's critical and subversive capacities, Marcuse
argues that the cultural and sexual spheres are now put to work in the service of the
established order. The needs and aspirations promoted by the advanced industrial system
shape the desires and life horizons of its citizens, thus establishing the preconditions for
215
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conformity to this system. By manipulating and controlling the desires of its citizens and
rendering all oppositional elements ineffectual, the establishment is able to grant more
liberties than ever before. The formerly "explosive" power of the sexual instincts is
rendered harmless by being "contained" within a system of effective controls. Thus,
whereas Marcuse's previous work focuses on the repressive "sublimation" of the drives,
by which instinctual aims are diverted towards non-sexual, unsatisfying labour, he now
focuses on the ways in which the establishment enables individuals to achieve immediate
release of instinctual urges on the basis of these new modes of manipulation and control.
He refers to this controlled release of unrestrained sexual desires as "repressive
desublimation."
In "The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive Desublimation,"
Marcuse illustrates his conception of "repressive desublimation" through a comparison of
the traditional and contemporary functions of art. He turns to the "high culture" of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly the works of Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe, Gustave Flaubert, and Thomas Mann. According to Marcuse, these great figures
were once able to achieve "artistic alienation" vis-a-vis the established bourgeois order.
However, "artistic alienation" is not to be confused with Marx's use of this term. On
Marx's account, alienation is a state in which the worker confronts virtually all aspects of
his or her life activity as hostile forces operating over and against him or her. In this
condition, the labourer is unable to achieve fulfillment from his or her labour and
functions merely as a tool to be manipulated and employed in the interests of maximizing
profit for a relative few.
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Through traditional forms of oppositional art, on the other hand, the artist is able
to recognize the prevailing unfreedom of the given society and achieve a critical distance
from it. "Artistic alienation," he writes, "is sublimation. It creates the images of
conditions which are irreconcilable with the established Reality Principle but which, as
cultural images, become tolerable, even edifying and useful."217 Although this period was
also characterized by toilsome labour, misery, and inequality, these artists were able to
transcend the oppressive order by offering images that represented the antithesis of
alienated social life: "such disruptive characters as the artist, the prostitute, the adulteress,
the great criminal and outcast," and so on.218

These images pointed beyond the

established society and represented a rebellion against the prevailing alienation that
characterized these times.
Under the advanced industrial apparatus, artistic creation loses its power to
negate the established reality principle by virtue of its containment within this system.
The previously antagonistic artistic images are transformed into "the national hero, the
beatnik, the neurotic housewife, the gangster, the star," none of which point beyond the
current civilization.219 These images no longer pose a threat to the established society
because their previously antagonistic elements have been assimilated to the system in
which they are manufactured and sold. Indeed, the fact that these images often
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"contradict the society which sells them does not count," since they have been made to
operate in the service of the established order.220
On Marcuse's account, the oppositional elements in the "higher culture" are
succumbing to the "process of desublimation which prevails in the advanced regions of
contemporary society."221 Most of its images no longer evoke forgotten truths and higher
ideals, but express the immediate ideals and interests of the prevailing social forces.
Whereas previous artistic creation demanded time, energy, and critical thought in order to
apprehend the underlying truths and messages conveyed in the work, contemporary art is
largely transformed into entertainment and treated as a "passive" leisure activity. We can
observe these tendencies even more clearly in the present age, where film is being
converted into big-budget Hollywood movies endorsing conformity and the pursuit of
money and power. The mass media also displays images of substance-abusing teenage
celebrities on magazine covers and entertainment television programs, thus promoting
ignorance and self-destructiveness. Cultural images no longer point to another realm
beyond the present, but become the very ideals of the society to which they were
originally opposed. According to Marcuse, the "assimilation of the ideal with reality
testifies to the extent to which the ideal has been surpassed."222
Marcuse argues that this process of repressive desublimation, "replacing mediated
by immediate gratification," also occurs in the "sexual sphere."223 Within this sexual
sphere, as in the realm of higher culture, Marcuse claims that repressive desublimaton
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"operates as the by-product of the social controls of technological reality, which extend
liberty while intensifying domination."224 On the one hand, he argues that the
technological capacities of advanced industrial society have created improved working
conditions, shortened working days, and a greater amount of "free" time in which the
worker might achieve instinctual gratification. On the other hand, the manipulation of the
individual's socio-cultural life ensures that this worker's instinctual drives are efficiently
coordinated and determined by the prevailing interests in domination. As a result, this
society can "grant more than before because its interests have become the innermost
drives of its citizens, and because the joys which it grants promote social cohesion and
contentment."225 Thus, sexuality becomes "liberalized" in the sense that it has been made
amenable to social and political manipulation and can express itself "freely" only on this
basis.
As I argued in the last chapter, Marcuse attempts to envisage a world in which
sexuality would be transformed into Eros. Rather than being pressed exclusively into the
service of procreation and "part-time" fulfillment, the life instincts would create an order
of gratification in which individuals would be able to achieve lasting instinctual
satisfaction in all aspects of their lives. Under fundamentally improved social conditions,
he claims that sexuality would undergo the process of "non-repressive sublimation,"
which would lead to higher pleasures for all zones of the body in an environment of
freedom. Already in Eros and Civilization, however, Marcuse begins to anticipate the
current modes of repressive desublimation that would become the subject of his later
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thought. He writes: "the free development of transformed libido beyond the institutions of
the performance principle differs essentially from the release of constrained sexuality
within the dominion of these institutions."226 In the latter case, the manifestations of
"mere sexuality" are not only rendered harmless by this society, but actually prevent the
individual from seeking "polymorphous" modes of instinctual gratification in a
fundamentally "eroticized" social and natural environment.
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse develops these earlier arguments concerning
the environment in which the "saved" libido is able to achieve gratification.227 Again, he
invokes past experiences of pleasure and compares them with those under present
conditions. While he acknowledges that the pre-technological world contained "misery,
toil, and filth," he claims that there was still "a 'landscape,' a medium of libidinal
experience which no longer exists."

On this point, he compares the act of making love

in a meadow to making love in an automobile. In the former instance, "the environment
partakes of and invites libidinal cathexis and tends to be eroticized. Libido transcends
beyond the immediate erotogenic zones—a process of nonrepressive sublimation."
Although this might seem to be an uncritical portrayal of life in the pre-technological
world, Marcuse is emphasizing the point that our technological capabilities are
"contained" within this system. While these technological forces could serve to beautify
the natural and social environment and intensify the overall experience of pleasure, they
are increasingly pressed into the service of wasteful production and the destruction of the
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natural world. Thus contained, these technical capacities create a "mechanized
environment" that precludes the "self-transcendence of libido."230
Furthermore, Marcuse suggests that a crucial dimension of erotic experience is
lost in a mechanized society in which commodities mediate virtually every human
interaction. In An Essay on Liberation, he argues that automobiles, televisions,
"household gadgets," and other products are not necessarily repressive in and of
themselves. Rather, they are repressive when they are "produced in accordance with the
requirements of profitable exchange," and, in turn, "become part and parcel of the
people's own existence, own 'actualization.'"231 Under the present conditions of
production and consumption, these products are created in order to maximize profit for
corporate stockholders and bind individuals to the system of repressive satisfaction. In
turn, he concludes that individuals must now "buy part and parcel of their own existence
on the market."232
By purchasing the commodities necessary to complete their sexual image,
individuals also become more efficient, attractive commodities in the labour force. In
Eros and Civilization, Marcuse claims that "only in exceptional cases, and with a high
degree of sublimation, are libidinal relations allowed to enter into the sphere of work."233
At this point, he extends his critique to the methods of containment and repressive sexual
liberty within the work world itself. "Without ceasing to be an instrument of labor," he
writes, "the body is allowed to exhibit its sexual features in the everyday work world and
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in work relations."

Indeed, sex-appeal is often considered to be a prerequisite for job

success, particularly in the service industry, the mass media, and certainly in the sex
trade. However, this "body" is only allowed to express its sexual features in work
relations after the beauty industry and other societal apparatuses have moulded the
individual to conform to prevailing standards of attractiveness.
Insofar as individuals conduct their labour for an apparatus that they do not
control, their work remains alienating. However, since the work world now consists of a
more attractive, marketable labour force, the work relations themselves appear to be more
gratifying.235 Since the repressive character of this labour is masked by its attractive
appearance, the workers come to identify themselves with their alienated performances.
Marcuse recognizes that "no matter how much it may serve as a prop for the status quo,"
this labour "is also gratifying to the managed individuals, just as racing the outboard
motor, pushing the power lawn mower, and speeding the automobile are fun."236 The
worker is thus preconditioned to accept the necessity of this labour despite the fact that it
is still carried out in the interests of the system of repressive satisfaction. Accordingly,
the individual develops what Marcuse labels a "happy consciousness."
This notion of the "happy consciousness" is inspired by G.W.F. Hegel's
conception of the "unhappy consciousness." In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel
describes the unhappy consciousness as self-consciousness divided into two contradictory
parts. On the one hand, it is "a merely empirical, confused, and transient self," bound up
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with a world of changeable objects and individuals. On the other hand, it is "an eternal,
rational, real self."

It is thus both a "changeable and inessential" being of this world

and an "unchangeable and essential" being connected to divine truth.238 In general terms,
then, the unhappy consciousness is consciousness aware of its own self-contradictory
nature: it realizes that there is divine truth and fulfillment, but it also realizes that it is
severed from this truth and will not be able to attain it.
On this basis, we can now begin to understand the differences between the
unhappy consciousness and the happy consciousness. According to Marcuse, traditional
works of literature and art reflected the unhappy consciousness of their time. Those artists
who achieved a certain degree of critical distance from the established society were able
to recognize the unactualized possibilities of this world and articulate those possibilities
through their work. Prior to their containment within the advanced industrial capitalist
system, art and literature reflected "the unhappy consciousness of the divided world, the
defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises betrayed."

In the sexual

sphere, those individuals who were forced to sublimate their drives in accordance with
the surplus-repressive performance principle were better able to recognize the
contradiction that this society refused to pacify human life despite its ability to drastically
reduce scarcity and want. In both cases, individuals were able to grasp the contradictory
nature of their society.
The happy consciousness, on the other hand, fails to recognize the fact that the
potentialities in this society have been contained. The individual feels content with the
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satisfactions he or she is granted and cannot imagine any possibilities beyond these
satisfactions. According to Marcuse, the happy consciousness "reflects the belief that the
real is rational, and that the established system, in spite of everything, delivers the
goods."240 The emergence of this happy consciousness reveals the extent to which the
established order is able to conquer all transcendent, oppositional modes of thought,
experience, and action. In short, individuals become content in their unfreedom.
At this point, Marcuse reveals the critical force of sublimation. When compared to
the prevailing forms of desublimation characteristic of advanced industrial civilization,
the "sublimated drives and objectives contain more deviation, more freedom, and more
refusal to heed the social taboos."241 While it seems obvious that Marcuse would consider
"non-repressive sublimation" more gratifying, life-enhancing, and oppositional when
compared to desublimation, even the case of "repressive sublimation" seems to be more
thoroughly oppositional than desublimation. Both of these types of sublimation would
involve the recognition of the barriers—whether basic repressive or surplus-repressive—
to the complete gratification of immediate instinctual strivings. "To be sure," Marcuse
writes, "all sublimation is enforced by the power of society, but the unhappy
consciousness of this power already breaks through alienation."242 Regardless of whether
or not the individual is able to break through this alienation in practice, she would still
recognize this alienation and potentially seek to overcome it. Thus, sublimation in its
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ideal form "becomes the cognitive power which defeats suppression while bowing to
it."243
Considering the fact that individuals believe themselves to be perfectly free in a
fundamentally unfree society, they no longer feel the need to sublimate their sexual
energy. By "diminishing erotic and intensifying sexual energy," he argues, "the
technological reality limits the scope of sublimation. It also reduces the need for
sublimation."244 The individual's ability to achieve gratification both in and outside of the
work place is limited to the raw, immediate satisfaction of the sexual instincts rather than
the "fuller Eros" that Marcuse endorses. This gratification is offered as a concession in
order to appease the masses and to keep them satisfied under alienated conditions. The
system of controlled gratification thus appears to require less repression of the
individual. As a result, "the tension between that which is desired and that which is
permitted seems considerably lowered," and the worker feels affirmed in her "free"
choices, desires, and aspirations.
Since this society appears to "deliver the goods," Marcuse argues that it
subsequently weakens the individual's capacity to resist the "cruel affluence" of the
apparatus and to rebel against it. The entire realm of prescribed aspirations and needs
"kills in its citizens the very disposition, the organs for the alternative: freedom without
exploitation."245 Although the individual does achieve a certain degree of satisfaction
from his or her gadgets, leisure activities, and work relations, these concessions serve to
mask the prevailing unfreedom both within and beyond the advanced industrial societies.

243

Ibid., p. 76.
Ibid., p. 73.
245
Idem, An Essay on Liberation, p. 17.
244

94

Through various modes of relaxation and controlled satisfaction, the individual is trained
to ignore the widespread poverty, genocides, and other systemic social problems that
occur throughout the world. The "Great Refusal" required to challenge and overcome
these issues is blocked through "compensation which seems more satisfying than the
refusal."246 Thus, the controlled sexual liberties granted by the establishment conquer all
transcendent modes of thought and action, providing "satisfaction in a way which
generates submission and weakens the rationality of protest."247

SECTION 3: SEXUAL LIBERALIZATION AND DESTRUCTIVENESS

As we have seen, Marcuse believes that the desublimation of sexual energy within
a system of effective controls does not enhance the greater potentialities of human beings.
Rather, it limits their capacity to experience lasting instinctual gratification in an
environment of freedom. Far from liberating the life instincts to bring about ever-greater
unities between individuals through "self-sublimation," repressive desublimation
liberates the unrestrained sexual instincts to pursue immediate gratification without
regard for the well-being and fulfillment of others. Competition, aggression, and the
individualistic pursuit of pleasure thus replace the sublimated bonds of affection,
tenderness, and solidarity. Therefore, Marcuse argues that "we are faced with the
contradiction that the liberalization of sexuality provides an instinctual basis for the
repressive and aggressive power of the affluent society."
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This correlation between the release of sexual energy and the heightening of
aggression is a "contradiction" because it seems to challenge Freud's notion that the
liberation of the sexual instincts would necessarily neutralize the death instincts.
However, Marcuse argues that since the "socially permitted and encouraged release of
libido" is that of "partial and localized sexuality, it would be tantamount to an actual
compression of erotic energy, and this desublimation would be compatible with the
growth of unsublimated as well as sublimated forms of aggressiveness."249 In other
words, strengthening the "partial" sexual instincts does not liberate the power of Eros to
bind the destructive energy of the death instincts. As such, he claims that repressive
desublimation "would imply the possibility of a simultaneous release of repressed
sexuality and aggressiveness."250
On this view, society is now in a better position to satisfy the demands of the
death instincts by channelling this aggressive energy for the purposes of dominating
human beings and the natural world. It should be noted, however, that not all
manifestations of destructiveness are detrimental to the material and social environment.
Indeed, the productive achievements of human civilization rely heavily on the use of such
energy to master the powers of nature and to construct parks, houses, buildings, and other
life-serving products.

Yet rather than bringing the death instincts into the service of

life-sustaining production, the current establishment mobilizes the collective aggressive
impulses against foreign nations, outsiders, and other group enemies. As long as the
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establishment continues to "deliver the goods," Marcuse believes that the majority will
passively accept "the misdeeds of this society."
In "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," Marcuse attempts to
identify the emerging social trends that account for the weakening of individual
autonomy and the widespread acceptance of the destructiveness of the advanced
OCT

industrial system. Elaborating upon his earlier observations in Eros and Civilization,
he argues that the individual no longer undergoes the same process of socialization and
development as the traditional Freudian subject. On Freud's account, the family is the
initial site of socialization. Through the trials of the Oedipus complex, the child develops
a superego, which influences the repressions that he or she carries out and establishes a
mature ego. This private familial process thus equips the child with the requisite mental
tools to handle the pressures and demands of the outside world and to eventually survive
under the reality principle.
Through this socialization process, "the younger generation entered societal life
with impulses, ideas, and needs which were largely their own."254 On the basis of this
private process of development and maturation, children develop a mature ego and
superego which are largely independent of the societal norms and values that they will
later confront. As such, these mature "individuals" become aware of the "irreconcilable
conflict" between themselves and their society.255 According to Marcuse, the "individual
remains unhappy with an unhappy consciousness," but he or she is also able to recognize
252
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the authority of the given society and the need to reach compromise satisfactions in the
face of its demands. Thus, the mature individual is able to achieve "relative autonomy"
from the established system insofar as he or she recognizes the rift between self and
other—individual and society—and attempts to negotiate between external demands and
private fulfillment.
Marcuse believes that current trends have rendered this "relatively autonomous"
subject obsolete. On his account, the formerly private socialization of the child is now
"being invalidated by society's direct management of the nascent ego through the mass
media, school and sport teams, gangs, etc."256 Considering the establishment's ubiquitous
controls over all dimensions of human life, the child is not able to develop an
independent ego and superego outside of the established system. As such, the immature
ego is unable to distinguish between self and other, between private fulfillment and social
requirements. Marcuse claims that "the ego ideal is rather brought to bear on the ego
directly and 'from outside,' before the ego is actually formed as the personal and
(relatively) autonomous subject of mediation between himself

and others."257

Accordingly, the individual does not develop his or her own ego ideal and "conscience"
but internalizes the societal superego directly. This process leads to the weakening of the
individual ego, the immediate identification with group ideals, and the numbing of the
individual's private, critical faculties of "consciousness and conscience."
Considering the above, both the weakness of the "individual" as an autonomous
subject and the inability of the unrestrained sexual instincts to counteract the death
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instincts account for citizens' acceptance and perpetuation of destructiveness in the
sexually "liberated" societies. By identifying immediately with the cultural ego-ideal, the
individual is trained to embrace the repressive satisfaction of the sexual instincts which,
in turn, releases destructive energy to be manipulated and employed by the establishment.
In order to sustain itself, the prevailing system directs this aggression towards outsiders
and enemies of the group. The societal ego-ideal "does not drive the conscience as the
moral judge of the ego, but rather directs aggression toward the external enemies of the
ego ideal."259 Since the demands of the "externalized," collective ego-ideal become the
innermost drives and needs of the individual, even acts of war and genocide meet "not
only with helpless acceptance, but also with instinctual approval on the part of the
victims."260
These changes in socialization and development also serve to diminish the
individual's experience of "guilt" over the aggressive acts of his or her society. As I
explained in Chapter 1, the sense of guilt results from a tension between the ego and the
superego. The superego establishes "conscience," which continuously reprimands the ego
if it does not conform to the demands of its ego-ideal. According to Marcuse, the direct
imposition of the cultural ego-ideal upon the immature ego now weakens personal
autonomy and diminishes the tension between the individual and society. As long as
individuals do not transgress the demands of the cultural "fathers," they are free to
commit destructive acts against others without experiencing guilt or remorse.261 As
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Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., p. 79.
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To be sure, this is not to suggest that Marcuse is lamenting the decline of guilt feeling in general. Rather,
he is highlighting the fact that individuals no longer experience any tension between themselves and the
destructive, repressive society of which they are a part.
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Marcuse so forcefully asserts: "[o]ne man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds
and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience, and live
happily ever after."262 Thus, conscience is absolved so long as the individual conforms to
the demands of the repressive society.

Idem, One-Dimensional Man, p. 79.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite the "obsolescence" of the Freudian subject, Marcuse argues that the
crucial insights of psychoanalysis are not invalidated. Rather, he argues that
"psychoanalysis draws its strength from its obsolescence: from its insistence on
individual needs and individual potentialities which have become outdated in the social
and political development."263 This is not to suggest, however, that Marcuse uncritically
accepts the historical rights of the patriarchal family or the traditional formation of the
ego-ideal. As we recall from the last chapter, Marcuse minimizes the significance of the
Oedipus complex and refrains from offering a method of decentering infantile
omnipotence and developing a strong superego. Yet Marcuse also argues that, for better
or worse, the traditional family produced "individuals" capable of distinguishing between
their own needs and desires and the repressive demands of their society. Insofar as the
Freudian conception of the individual preserves the importance of individual autonomy
and the development of those critical capacities necessary to question and challenge the
established reality principle, his theory points to a lost dimension of human experience
that must be recaptured.
Furthermore, the prevailing "containment" of Eros and the release of unmitigated
sexual and aggressive energy strengthens Marcuse's earlier position that a non-repressive
civilization requires the "self-sublimation" of the life instincts. Since the "repressive
desublimation" of "mere sexuality" prevents individuals from developing their own
unique, life-affirming faculties and capabilities, the need to release the life instincts
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Idem, "The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man," p. 60.
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becomes more pressing than ever before. Despite their containment in advanced
industrial society, the radical movements of the 1960s reveal the possibility of activating
"the elementary, organic foundation of morality in the human being," which is "perhaps
rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve 'ever greater
unities' of life."264 In this regard, Marcuse retains his hope that the life instincts could
potentially provide a "biological foundation for socialism," thus establishing a "sensuous
order" wherein individuals with different needs and desires would be free to express
themselves under fundamentally different material and social conditions.265
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Idem, An Essay on Liberation, p. 10.
For a complete discussion of this "biological," or instinctual, foundation for socialism, see Marcuse, An
Essay on Liberation, pp. 7-22. In his later work, Marcuse also emphasizes the critical role that transgressive
art can play in exposing the repressive and oppressive character of the given reality and pointing to
qualitatively different modes of thought and experience through the "aesthetic form." See Marcuse, The
Aesthetic Dimension .-Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977).
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CONCLUSION

In his polemical attack against Marcuse, Alasdair Maclntyre attempts to
invalidate his critical sexual theory on the grounds that he does not provide any positive
"content" for a fundamentally liberated society. Maclntyre sums up this criticism in one
crucial question, namely, "[w]hat will we actually do in this sexually liberated state?"266
Furthermore, he claims that Marcuse's criticisms of the "monogamic, genital sexual
culture" are meaningless unless "some contrast with what is possible but unrealized has
been effectively delineated."267 Since he fails to address these issues, Maclntyre claims,
Marcuse's argument is nonsensical and ineffectual.
It is my contention that this criticism ignores the purpose and force of Marcuse's
position by demanding that he provide "positive" content for a truly liberated society.
Considering his commitment to radical democracy, he avoids venturing exact
prescriptions for creating a fundamentally better world in order to open the horizon for
collectively decided social change. What we should take from Marcuse is the value and
critical force of what he calls "negative thinking," and the role that philosophy as
"critique" can play in diagnosing exigent social problems with the view of overcoming
the repressive organization of human life.
In the final pages of An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse claims that "[n]egative
thinking draws whatever force it may have from its empirical basis: the actual human
condition in the 'given' society, and the 'given' possibilities to transcend this condition,

Alasdair Maclntyre, Marcuse (London: Fontana, 1970) p. 47.
Ibid.
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to enlarge the realm of freedom."

By critically reflecting upon material and social life,

philosophy as "critique" has the power to identify "the actual human condition" as it is
lived and felt in our civilization, while also recognizing the "damaged" conditions under
which human beings are forced to live. It is on the basis of this recognition of unfreedom,
injustice, and unhappiness that "emphatic" counter-concepts such as freedom, justice, and
happiness can be formulated, even if we do not yet know the precise form our freedom
and happiness will take. This formation of emphatic concepts—which arise as the
antithesis of the given reality—constitutes the properly critical dimension of philosophy
as critique.
Marcuse recognizes both the prevailing unfreedom associated with the current
liberalization of sexuality, as well as the inherent possibility within this society to
drastically reduce material scarcity, to minimize painful physical labour, and to enable
individuals to determine their own erotic horizons beyond the system of repressive
satisfaction. Yet, against Maclntyre, it is not necessarily the task of critique to offer an
exact map of a better world. With regards to such demands that all criticism be
"constructive," or positive, Adorno writes: "The insinuation is that only someone can
practice critique who can propose something better than what is being criticized....By
making the positive a condition for it, critique is tamed from the beginning and loses its
vehemence."269 The task of critique is to identify contradictions and falsities within
material and social life in order to open the horizon for collectively organized social
change. In this light, Adorno concludes his essay "Critique" with the claim that "the
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Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, p. 87.
Adorno, "Critique," Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, tr. Henry W. Pickford, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1998) p. 287.
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false, once determinately known and precisely expressed, is already an index of what is
right and better."270
In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse echoes Adorno's focus on the power of
"negative thinking" when he claims that universal, "emphatic" concepts "conceptualize
the stuff of which the experienced world consists, and they conceptualize it with a view
of its possibilities, in the light of their actual limitation, suppression, and denial."271 Far
from prescribing acceptable desires, aspirations, or precise courses of political action,
Marcuse's diagnosis of the repression of sexuality under advanced industrial civilization
is intended to create the opening for a new social consciousness which will lead to more
autonomous, pleasurable forms of thought and experience.
This non-repressive civilization would consist of individuals who are able to think
critically about their instinctual needs and desires with a view of what they could become
if the "damaged" conditions under which they have been repressed were fundamentally
779

changed.

Marcuse's critique seeks to indict the repressive affluence of late capitalism

in order to envisage a world in which free individuals determine their own pleasures, and
"really exist as individuals, each shaping his [or her] own life; they would face each other
with truly different needs and truly different modes of satisfaction—with their own
•
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refusals and their own selections."
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Ibid., p. 288.
Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, p. 215.
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On this point, we should recall Marcuse's appropriation of Paul Valery's characterization of thought as
"le travail qui fait vivre en nous ce qui n'existe pas." See One-Dimensional Man, p. 68.
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Idem, Eros and Civilization, pp. 227-8.
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